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QUESTION PRESENTED

In this case petitioner Price Waterhouse was held to
have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
because of its failure to make respondent Hopkins a partner in the firm. Although Price Waterhouse was held to
have established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason for that decision, the court of appeals
characterized the case as one involving "mixed motives"
for the employment decision because the firm's decisionmaking process included some unconscious and unquantifiable measure of impermissible "sex stereotyping."
The court of appeals held, 2-1, in conflict with the decisions of this Court and of other courts of appeals, that
in a "mixed motive" case the plaintiff prevails unless the
defendant shows-and shows by clear and convincing evidence-that impermissible bias was not a decisive cause
of the employment decision.
The question presented is whether the court of appeals
was in error in shifting the burden of persuasion on the
issue of intentional discrimination to the defendant, and
in defining that burden in accordance with the "clear and
convincing" standard, even though the district court
found that there existed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory,
and nonpretextual reason for the employment decision,
and even though there was no showing that discriminatory bias played any causal role in that decision.
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No.
PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER

v.
ANN

B. HOPKINS, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI T'O THE
UNITED STATES, COURT OF APPEALS,
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Price Waterhouse respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
this case.
OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, infra,
la-39a) is reported at 825 F.2d 458. The opinion of the
district court ( Gesell, D.J.) ( App. B, infra, 40a-62a) is
reported at 618 F. Supp. 1109.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (App. C, infra,
63a) was entered on August 4, 1987, and a petition for
rehearing was denied on September 30, 1987 (App. D,
infra, 65a). 011- December 11, 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist extended the time for filing this petition to January
12, 1988. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 u.s.c. § 1254 ( 1).

2
STATEMENT
1. Introduction. The question presented by this peti-

tion involves the proper allocation of burdens of proof in
Title VII cases, and is one on which the courts of appeals are in sharp conflict. Here a divided panel of the
court of appeals (Edwards, J., and Joyce Hens Green,
D.J., with Williams, J., dissenting) held that Price
Waterhouse violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, when it declined to make respondent, Ann B. Hopkins, a partner in the firm. The
court of appeals did not disturb the district court's factual finding that Price Waterhouse had established a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual basis
for its decision not to make Hopkins a partner, but it
held that that showing was insufficient to negate liability
under Title VII because the process by which Hopkins
was considered for partnership may have included some
unquantifiable measure of impermissible "sex stereotyping." Even though Hopkins presented no evidence of any
illicit motivation on the part of any of the persons actually responsible for making the partnership decision
at Price Waterhouse, the court of appeals characterized
the case as one involving "mixed motives" on the basis
of the testimony of an "expert * * * in the field of [sex]
stereotyping" ( App. 53a) who purported to see "sex
stereotyping" in some of the casual language used about
Hopkins by a few individuals (none of them final decisionmakers in her case, and all but one of them supporters of her partnership bid). It then held that in such
"mixed motive" cases (a) the defendant employer bears
the burden of proving that unlawful bias was not the
determinative factor in the challenged employment decision; and (b) that burden must be carried by "clear
and convincing" evidence.
The first question before this Court is whether-and in
what circumstances-t he plaintiff in a Title VII action
may be relieved of the ultimate burden of proving that
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intentional discrimination was a but-for cause of the
adverse employment action. Second, even if such a dramatic departure from this Court's Title VII precedents
and the conventional rules of the legal system is appropriate in limited circumstances, the further question is
whether the employer in such a case must negative unlawful bias by the extraordinary standard of clear and
convincing evidence. There is a direct and highly confusing series of conflicts among the courts of appeals on
both of these questions.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
( 1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 ( 1981), this Court allocated the burdens of proof and persuasion in Title VII disparate
treatment cases. Emphasizing that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff," the Court established a
"division of intermediate evidentiary burdens" designed
to resolve the "ultimate question" of intentional discrimination that a plaintiff must prove. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 253. First, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. The defendant is then permitted to meet that
preliminary showing by "'articulat[ing] some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'"
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802). If the defendant comes forward with
such evidence, the plaintiff may attempt "to demonstrate
that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A
plaintiff who makes such a showing by a preponderance
of the evidence will have successfully carried her burden
of proving that she was "the victim of intentional discrimination." Ibid.
In Burdine, however, the Court specifically "discussed
only the situation in which the issue is whether either
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not both, we re the 'tru e'
illegal or legal motives, but
NL RB v. Transportation
motives behind the decision."
393, 400 n.5 (1983) (emManagement Corp., 462 U.S.
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dence or may he satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence instead.
We discuss below the conflict among the circuits and
the need for a definitive resolution by this Court (see
pages 13-17, infra). First, however, we briefly describe
the findings and conclusions of the courts below.
2. The District Court's Findings. Hopkins initiated
this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that unlawful sex discrimination was the cause of Price Waterhouse's decision not to
advance her to partnership in 1982.1 In response, Price
Waterhouse showed that during her five-year period of
employment with the firm her abrasive personality and
deficient interpersonal skills created grave problems, making it particularly difficult for employees subject to her
supervision to work harmoniously with her. One staff
member (who testified on Hopkins' behalf) indicated that
"it required 'diplomacy, patience and guts' to work with
her." App. 46a ( quoting 3/27 /85 Tr. 434). The district
court accepted this showing, agreeing with Price Waterhouse that Hopkins "had considerable problems dealing
with staff and peers." App. 59a. Indeed, after carefully
examining Hopkins' employment history at Price Waterhouse, the district court found that both "[s] upporters
and opponents of her candidacy indicated that [Hopkins]
was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult
1 Initially, Price Waterhouse decided only to place Hopkins'
partnership candidacy on "hold" for at least a year, " 'to afford
[Hopkins] time to demonstrate that she has the personal and
leadership qualities required of a partner.'" App. 44a (citation
omitted). Several months after that decision, however, two Price
Waterhouse partners who had been key advocates of Hopkins'
partnership bid decided instead to oppose it, and Hopkins' advocates concluded that reconsideration in the next year's partnership selection cycle would therefore be in vain. The district court
found that the decision not to reconsider was not discriminatory
(id. at 48a), and Hopkins did not appeal that determination.
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Id. at 43a-44a.
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absence of any sexual stereotyping or that such conduct
was actually a motivating factor in Price Waterhouse's
decision. ( Indeed, the district court did not find even
"unconscious" stereotyping on the part of any person at
Price Waterhouse responsible for actually making the
relevant decision about Hopkins.) Nevertheless, the district court found that Title VII was violated. The violation was deemed to arise from the confluence of three
factors, none of which the court thought was discriminatory standing alone. First, "[c]omments influenced" albeit "unconsciou sly"-"by sex stereotypes were made
by partners." Second,
the firm's evaluation process gave substantial weight
to these comments; and [third], the partnership
failed to address the conspicuous problem of stereotyping in partnership evaluations. While these three
factors might have been innocent alone, they combined to produce discriminatio n in the case of this
plaintiff.
App. 58a. Price Waterhouse was found liable because,
"[d] espite the fact that the comments on women candidates often suggested that the male evaluators may have
been influenced by sex bias, the Policy Board never addressed the problem." Id. at 55a.
The defendant's liability was thus not predicated upon
an employment decision shown to have been made on the
basis of gender; the district court did not find that discrimination caused Hopkins' rejection. Price Waterhouse
was found to have committed an intentional violation of
Title VII solely by failing to counteract the unconscious
sexism that the court read into the colloquialisms of some
of her colleagues-n one of them the ultimate decisionmakers-com menting on her performance in the course
of the evaluation process.
The district court's imposition of liability notwithstand ing its failure to find that Hopkins' rejection was caused
by discriminatio n is particularly troubling because of the
way in which the existence of even "unconscious" sex
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II

steretoyp ing was divined. The district court's insight
into these unconscious elements of Price Waterho use's
partnersh ip decisionmaking process came primaril y from
the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, "a well qualified expert"
in the "field of stereotyp ing." App. 53a. Although
Dr. Fiske had never met Hopkins, and made no inquiry
whatever into the facts of Hopkins' actual performa nce
at Price Waterhouse, her review of the written comments
made by Price Waterhouse partners about Hopkins' performance enabled her to opine that the partners ' negative;
statemen ts about Hopkins' rudeness, arrogance, and
abrasiveness were caused by sexual stereotypes rather
than the reality that they accuratel y described. Dr. Fiske
reached this conclusion by simply excluding from her consideratio n the actual evidence of Hopkins' behavior, evidence that persuade d even the district court that Hopkins'
"conduct provided ample justificat ion for the complaints"
about her. Id. at 46a-47a. Here is a typical exchange:
* * * Some of these folks describe Miss Hopkins, as you have read back to me, as overbearing,
arrogant , self-centered, abrasive, thinks she knows
more than anyone in the universe, and potential ly
dangerous. Would you think it would be somehow a
stereotypical decision to exclude such a person from
the partnersh ip if that was in fact true?
A. I am not qualified to say whether or not it is
true * * * [b] ecause I didn't observe her behavior.
Q.

3/ 28/ 85 Tr. 596-597.
As Judge Williams, dissenting below, observed, this
means that "if an observer character ized someone as
'overbear ing and arrogant and abrasive and running over
people,' an expert such as Dr. Fiske could discern * * *
that [those comments] stemmed from unconscious stereotypes * * * without meeting the subject of the comment
or making any inquiry into a possible factual basis."
App. 36a. Further, Dr. Fiske found forbidden motives
even in the comments of partners who supported Hopkins'

9

partnership bid because their favorable comments were
efforts "to overcome their stereotypical attitudes." Id. at
13a n.3 (citing 3/28/85 Tr. 565). It seems clear, therefore, that on this approach "no woman could be overbearing, arrogant or abrasive: any observations to that effect
would necessarily be discounted as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like this is to prevail in federal
courts, no employer can base any adverse action as to a
woman on such attributes." App. 36a (Williams, J.,
dissenting) .2
3. The Court Of Appeals' Decision. A divided panel of
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding
of liability as well as the theory upon which it was based.
Most important for present purposes, the court expressly
recognized that the causation issue was at the center of
the case. Noting the split among the circuits as to where
the burden of proof should be placed (App. 21a n.8), the
court of appeals rejected Price Waterhouse's appeal only
"[b] ecause Price Waterhouse could not demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that impermissible bias
was not the determinativ e factor" (id. at 25a). Price
Waterhouse was held to have violated Title VII solely on
the basis of the amorphous proposition that "stereotypical
attitudes towards women had manifested themselves in
connection with the partnership bids of other women and
* * * that these stereotypes had been brought to bear on
Dr. Fiske's testimony was disturbing in yet another respect.
Over Price Waterhouse's objection (3/28/85 Tr. 539), Hopkins was
permitted to use Dr. Fiske as a "rebuttal" witness in a supposed
effort to negate Price Waterhouse's showing that it had a legitimate,
nondiscriminat ory reason for its decision not to make Hopkins a
partner. At this stage of the case, however, Hopkins should have
been permitted only to attempt to prove that the reason articulated
by Price Waterhouse was a pretext for discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. In fact, Hopkins never attempted to prove
pretext, and, as previously noted, the district court expressly found
that the complaints about Hopkins' "interpersonal skills were not
fabricated as a pretext for discrimination" (App. 46a) (emphasis
added).
2
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[Hopkins'] candidacy" (id. at 20a)-even though Hopkins had not proved that she would have been made a
partner in the absence of stereotyping. Indeed, the court
of appeals expressly refused to require Hopkins to make
any such showing. Assigning to Title VII plaintiffs the
burden of proof on every aspect of their cases, including
causation, the court held, would "place an enormous, perhaps insurmountable, burden on Title VII litigants"
(ibid;). Instead, the court of ·appeals shifted the burden
to Price Waterhouse to negate by clear and convincing
evidence a fact that the court acknowledged was "impossible to measure." App. 9a. 3
In dissent, Judge Williams agreed that the central issue
on appeal was causation, but observed that "the record
here provided no causal connection between Hopkins' fate
and such stereotyping as went on among Price Waterhouse's 662 partners." App. 29a. 4 Judge Williams also
3 After being informed that she would not be reproposed for
partnership (see note 1, supra), Hopkins resigned from the firm.
The district court held that Hopkins failed to prove that the decision not to repropose was a "constructive discharge," and it therefore ruled that Hopkins was not entitled to an order directing Price
Waterhouse to make her a partner. App. 60a-6la. The court of
appeals reversed this aspect of the district court's decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings on the remedial phase
of the case. Id. at 27a-28a.
4

As Judge Williams noted, "[t]he only remark by a Hopkins

opponent that can be characterized as manifesting sexual stereotyp-

ing is the facetious . suggestion that she should take a 'course at
charm school.' The smoke from this gun seems to me rather wispy.
It was embedded in the following comment :
Contacts with Ann are only casual-several mtgs at OGS and
MMGS sessions. However, she is consistently annoying and irritating-believes she knows more than anyone about anything,
is not afraid to let the world know it. Suggest a course at
charm school before she is considered for admission. I would
be embarrassed to introduce her as a ptnr."
'I

App. 33a (emphasis added). The majority was able to find evidence
of sex stereotyping in the "charm school" remark only by resorting
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was troubled by Dr. Fiske's impressive claim that she
was "able to find forbidden stereotyping simply by reading
partners' comments-w ithout information about the truth
of the matters commented upon." Id at 36a. Finally,
Judge Williams objected to the majority's willingness to
find that the mere presence of stereotypes would result in
Title VII liability unless the employer undertook "to
institute special programs for sensitizing partners to sex
stereotyping or otherwise to stamp it out of the evaluation
process." Id. at 37a. Judge Williams suggested that,
[i]f such an omission is to ground liability, perhaps
the plaintiff should bear an initial burden of demonstrating that gender stereotyping was more probably
than not the cause of the adverse employment decision. * * *
From the facts here, it looks as though the duty
to sensitize has a hair trigger. The implications are
serious. The more delicate the trigger, the more
completely this court has dropped the requirement of
intentional discrimination out of the law. * * * The
rule turns Title VII from a prohibition of discriminatory conduct into an engine for rooting out sexist
thoughts.
Ibid.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In conflict with decisions of this Court and of other
courts of appeals, the court of appeals in this case incorrectly decided questions of great importance to the administration of the civil rights laws. This Court has held
to Webster's definition, not of that term, but of the term "finishing
school." See App. 13a n.4. But Webster's defines "charm school"
in sex-neutral terms, stating simply that it is "a school in which
social graces are taught." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 378 (1986). The majority did not explain why it would be
discriminatory for Price Waterhouse to insist that all of its partners, male and female, be schooled in the social graces.
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that the burden of persuasion in Title VII cases remains
at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256. The court of appeals' decision contravenes that principle in at least three ways. First, the court's decision
requires the defendant to prove that discrimination did
not cause the adverse employment decision, rather than
r equiring the plaintiff to prove that it did. Second, even
if it were appropriate to relieve the plaintiff of the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of causation
in specific, narrow circumstances, the court of appeals
erred gravely by requiring the defendant to make its
showing by clear and convincing evidence. Third, the
court of appeals improperly evaded the holding of Burdine
by characterizing this case as one of "mixed motives" on
the basis of impalpable evidence of supposed sexismdiscernible only through an "expert" judgment that in
fact ignored most of the actual evidence in the case-that was not shown to have had a causal impact on the
disputed employment decision. The net effect of the court
of appeals' decision is to place a virtually insurmountable
burden on an employer, even where there exists overwhelming evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminator y,
and nonpretextual basis for its refusal to promote a Title
VII plaintiff.
The circuits are in total disarray on the appropriate
allocation of the burdens and standards of proof in
so-called "mixed-motive" cases, adopting no fewer than
five different approaches to this issue. Review by this
Court is needed to abate this confusion. And review is
particularly appropriate in this case because, among the
possible approaches to this problem, the court below chose
one that clearly violates this Court's precedents and cannot be squared with the policies of Title VII. Accordingly,
review by this Court is warranted.
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A. The Conflict Among The Circuits Requires Resolution
By This Court.

As the court of appeals recognized (App. 20a-21a &
n.8), the circuits are in conflict on the question whether
a Title VII plaintiff must prove that impermissible discrimination was a "but-for" cause of a challenged employment decision. 0 Lacking a uniform rule, the courts of
appeals have devised no fewer than five inconsistent ways
to resolve cases in which it is argued that the defendant
acted on the basis of both a lawful and an unlawful
motive.
The first approach is based on this Court's statement
in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
282 n.10 ( 1976), that, for a Title VII plaintiff to prevail, "no more is required to be shown than that race
was a 'but for' cause" of the challenged employment decision. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits
draw their rule in mixed-motive cases from this observation, holding that "a [Title VII] plaintiff must show that
his status as a minority class was the but for reason
for the treatment accorded." Bellissimo v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986) (emphasis added) (citing
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 916 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984), and noting
the "considerable confusion" regarding the proper standard of proof in Title VII cases). Accord Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365-366 ( 4th
Cir. 1985) (" [f] or the employee to disprove a legitimate
5 Although the court of appeals recognized the existence of a conflict, it did not fully describe the extent of that conflict, nor did it
evidence any awareness that the conflict embraces two separate
questions: first, whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the
burden of proving causation in a "mixed-motive" case and, second,
whether the standard of proof by which that burden must be met
is a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.
Compare pages 13-16, infra, with App. 21a n.8.
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nondiscriminatory explanation for adverse action, the
third stage of the Burdine analysis, we determine that he
must show that the adverse action would not have occurred
'but for' the protected conduct';); 6 Jack v. Texaco
Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1984)
( "the employee will prevail only by proving that 'but for'
the protected activity she would not have been subjected
to the action of which she claims"); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("the employee must establish that the discriminatory motivation was a determining factor in the
challenged employment decision in that the employee
would have received the job absent the discriminatory
motivation").
The second approach, adopted by the First, Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits, turns on the same "but-for" inquiry
but reverses the burden of proof. These courts require
the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that, even without the forbidden motive, it would have
made the same employment decision. Fields v. Clark
University, 817 F.2d 931, 936 ( 1st Cir. 1987) ( once
plaintiff proves "that unlawful discrimination was a
motivating factor in the employment decision * * * the
defendant must prove that the same decision would have
6
In an earlier case, the Fourth Circuit appeared to adopt the
rule followed in the Ninth Circuit (see page 16, infra), holding
that, " [ o] nee a plaintiff establishes that she was discriminated
against, the defendant bears the burden of showing [by clear and
convincing evidence] that the plaintiff would not have been promoted even in the absence of discrimination." Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982). Although
the Fourth Circuit has never overruled Patterson, it has cited that
decision only twice since it decided Ross--once in a dissenting
opinion and once in dictum. See Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg
& Potomac R.R., 803 F.2d 1322, 1332 (1986) (Haynsworth, J., disrenting) ; Soble v. University of Maryland, 778 F.2d 164, 166 n.4
(1985) (dictum). Ross, therefore, apparently represents prevailing
Fourth Circuit law. The situation in the Fourth Circuit confirms
the extent of confusion and disarray among the courts of appeals.
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been made absent the discrimination") ; Terbovitz v.
Fiscal Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th
Cir. 1987) (quoting Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775
F .2d 703, 712 ( 6th Cir. 1985) ) (if plaintiff shows the
presence of an illegal motive, "the burden shifts to the
employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 'that
the adverse employment action would have been taken
even in the absence of the impermissible motivation' ") ;
Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557
(11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1284 (1984)
(quoting Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d
769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that
"[o] nee an [illegal] motive is proved to have been a
significant or substantial factor in an employment decision, defendant can rebut only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have
been reached even absent the presence of that factor"
(emphasis added by the Birmingham Linen court)).
The District of Columbia Circuit likewise requires the
defendant in a mixed-motive case to prove that it would
have made the same employment decision even absent the
proscribed motivation. App. 23a-25a. But that court goes
further, requiring that the showing be made not by a
preponde,r ance of the evidence but by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 25a.
Finally, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits draw a distinction between the liability and remedy phases of a Title
VII case. The Eighth Circuit holds that Title VII liability is established whenever an illegal motive is present
in an adverse employment decision, even if the same
decision would have been made in the absence of the forbidden motive. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir.
1985) (en bane). The finding of liability will entitle the
plaintiff to at least some relief, such as "a declaratory
judgment, partial attorney's fees, and injunctive relief"
(id. at 1324). But a defendant in the Eighth Circuit can
avoid the award of retroactive promotion or reinstatement
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and back pay by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same employment
action in any event. Id. at 1324 & n.5.
The Ninth Circui t employs an essentially simila r
analysis, but it permit s the defend ant to avoid the imposition of affirmative relief only if it can prove by clear and
convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it would have made the same decision
even in the absence of the prohibited motivation. Fadhl
v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 11651166 (9th Cir. 1984); Muntin v. California Parks &
Recreation Dep't, 738 F.2d 1054, 1055-1056 (9th Cir.
1984) ; see also Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State
Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 787 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986).
As the foregoing summa ry demonstrates, the lower
courts are in need of guidance on the proper standa rds
and allocation of burden s of proof for mixed-motive Title
VII claims, being divided in several different ways. Some
assign the but-for burden to the plaintiff; some to the
defendant. Some hold that the but-for inquiry is irrelevant in the liability context, but dispositive at the remedy
stage. Finally, even those circuit s that agree that the
defend ant must make the but-for showing at some phase
of the litigati on cannot agree on the standa rd of proof:
some hold that the defend ant must make its showing by
clear and convincing evidence, while others require only
a preponderance.'1
The distric t court's factua l findings in this case-t hat
atmospheric sexism could be detected in some of the written evaluations of Hopkins' performance, but that Hop-

'

The Solicito r General recently noted the existenc e of this latter
conflict in his Brief in Opposition (at 8 n.4) in Haskins v. United
States Dep't of the Army, cert. denied, No. 86-1626 (Oct. 5, 1987).
As the governm ent there explained, Haskins was an inappro priate
case in which to resolve the conflict because the plaintiff in that case
received the benefit of the clear and convincing standar d and yet
still failed to win her case.
7
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kins did not show that she would have been asked to be
a partne r even absen t that facto r-clea rly presen t the
issu,es that must be resolved. The instan t case is theref ore
well suited to enable this Court to provide the necessary
guidance. 8
B. This Court's Precedents Dictate That A Title VII
Plaint iff May Prevail Only By Showing That Discrimination Was A But-For Cause Of The Challenged
Employment Decision.

Burdi ne's statem ent that the plaint iff retain s the "ultimate burde n of persua ding the court that she has been
the victim of intent ional discri minat ion," 450 U.S. at
256, precludes a Title VII defen dant from being saddled
with the burde n of persua sion on the question of causation. As Burdi ne itself explained, the interm ediate burden placed on a defen dant is merely one of produ ction:
the defen dant must come forwa rd with evidence that it
had a legitim ate reason for the challenged employment
decision, but the defend ant need not prove anythi ng.
Thus, the Court stated ,
[t]he defend ant need not persua de the court that it
was actual ly motivated by the proffered reasons. It
is sufficient if the defend ant's evidence raises a
genuine issue of fact as to wheth er it discri minat ed
again st the plaintiff. * * * If the defend ant carrie s
this burde n of production, the presum ption raised by
the prima f acie case is rebutt ed * * *.
Id. at 254-255 (citati on and footnotes omitte d).
The ultima te issue in a case like this one is the same
as the ultima te issue in a case like Burdine: did discriminatio n cause the plaint iff's injury ? Burdi ne teaches
8

A ruling in this case from this Court would be import ant not
only for private employers, but also for the federal govern ment,
in light of the large numbe r of Title VII cases brough t in the
District of Columbia agains t the federal govern ment in its capacit
y as
the nation' s largest employer.
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that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving an affirma.:
tive answer to that question. Of course, a forbidden motive cannot have caused an injury if the employment decision would have been the same in any event. If the law
requires a plaintiff to prove that discriminatio n caused
her injury, the same law must necessarily require the
plaintiff to show that without discriminatio n the injury
would not have occurred.
This rule-that the party with the burden of persuasion must at a minimum show but-for causation-is the
conventional tort rule. Indeed,
the "but-for" or "sine qua non" rule * * * [is] [a]t
most * * * a rule of exclusion: if the event would
not have occurred "but for" the defendant's negligence, it still does not follow that there is liability.
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 238-239 (4th ed. 1971) .9
The same rule should be applied here.
Burdine instructs that the burden of proof is allocated in discriminatio n cases in the same way it is allocated in other kinds of civil litigation. This Court has
on other occasions relied on analogies to tort or other
civil law in deducing the rules to govern cases brought
under Title VII. See, e.g., United States Postal Servic'e
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (cautioning that the
differences between Title VII litigation and other cases
does not mean "that trial courts or reviewing courts
should treat discriminatio n differently from other ultimate questions of fact") ; see also Anderson v. City of
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (clearing erroneous
standard of review applies with the same force in Title
VII litigation as in other civil cases).
An exception is the, case in which either of two actions is
independently sufficient to cause an injury. See Prosser, supra, at
240; H.L.A. Hart & A. Honore, Causation in the Law 107 (1973).
That exception is irrelevant here.
9
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Removing the causation burden from the plaintiff has
highly undesirable consequences. The antidis crimin ation
laws address intentions as well as conduct, and some
efforts will therefo re be necessary under any rule to ascertain the defend ant's motivation. But an affirmative
finding that the defend ant violated the law ( and should
therefo re be subject to governmentally imposed sanctions) by discrim inating in an employment decision,
even where there existed a wholly legitim ate and nonpretex tual basis for that decision, should be based on
fair and substa ntial evidence that intentional discrimination played a decisive role; it should not be based on
pretex tual basis for that decision, should be based on
fragme ntary evidence of possible sexist factors that are
artificially leveraged into a finding of "intent ion discrimination " by a shift in the burden of persuasion. Title
VII was not designed to prevent employers from basing
employment decisions on legitimate, job-related, nondiscrimin atory factors ; if one of these exists and is shown
to be nonpretextual, the employment decision should not
be overturned without a fair affirmative basis for believing that that decision would not have been made without
the presence of a prohibited motive.
Furthe r, without a fair affirmative showing of causation, liability will have been imposed solely because of
perceived "discrimination in the air"-b ecause of vague
notions of "societal discrimination" that have not been
shown to have harmed the plaintiff directly. This Court
has repeatedly refused to adopt such a standa rd. Wygan t
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986)
(opinion of Powell, J.); Regents of the Univer sity of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-308 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). See also Fields v. Clark University,
817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987) (proof that "the [challenged] decision was infected with discrim ination " does
not necessarily entitle plaintiff to relief) . Indeed, the
express language of Title VII itself precludes a finding of
liabilit y in the absence of proof of causation. The statute
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provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's * * * sex" ( 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1) (emphasis added)). Further, Title VII
expressly prohibits courts from requiring "the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused * * * emp.ZOyment or advancement * * * for any reason other than discrimination on
account of * * * sex" ( 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) ( emphasis
added) ) . As the Seventh Circuit recognized, the language of "Title VII contains a clear causal requirement
between discriminatory motivation and the challenged
employment decision." McQuillen, 830 F.2d at 664. The
court of appeals' decision in this case, relieving plaintiff
of the burden of proving causation, cannot be reconciled
with these e·x press statutory limitations on the reach of
Title VIL1°
1"l We recognize that in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), the Court held that once a plaintiff has
shown that constitutionally protected conduct was a "substantial"
or "motivating" factor in an adverse employment decision, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same employment decision even
in the absence of the protected conduct. Similarly, in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), the Court
accepted the NLRB's position that once the General Counsel of the
Board has proved that conduct protected by the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., was a "substantial" or
"motivating" factor in the discharge of an employee, the burden
shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
"that the discharge would have occurred in any event and for valid
reasons" ( 462 U.S. at 400). These cases, however, did not address
the specific language of Title VII, and thus they do not govern the
question presented here. And even if Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management were thought to support shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant in a Title VII case, the most that could be
required of the employer under those cases is proof by a preponder. ance of the evidence that the employment decision would have been
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C. Even If A Defendant Must
Show That The Same Decision Would Have Been Made
Without The Forbidden
Motive, The Court Of Appea
ls Erred By Requiring
Th at That Showing Be Made By
Clear And Convincing
Evidence.

The Co urt has made it cle ar tha
t the int ere sts at issue
in a Tit le VI I case, while im por
tan t, do not jus tify depar tur e fro m the settled rul es
gov ern ing " 'the basic allocation of bur den s and ord er
of pre sen tati on of pro of. '"
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (quoti
ng Burdine, 450 U.S. at
252 ). Th e Aik ens Co urt sta ted
:
All cou rts have recognized tha t
the question fac ing
trie rs of fac t in dis cri min atio n
cases is both sensitive
and difficult. The prohibitions
aga
contained in the Civil Rig hts Ac ins t dis cri min atio n
im por tan t nat ion al policy. Th t of 1964 reflect an
"eyewitness" testimony as to theere will seldom be
processes. Bu t none of this me employer's me nta l
or reviewing courts should treatans that trial courts
ferently from other ultimate que discrimination difstions of fact.
460 U.S. at 716 (emphasis add
ed) . See also id. at 718
(Blackmun, J., con cur rin g) ("t
he ult im ate det erm ina tio n of fac tua l liab ilit y in dis cri
min atio n cases should be
no dif fer ent fro m tha t in oth er
typ es of civil sui ts" ).
Th is Co urt has consistently affi
rmed tha t the preponder anc e of the evidence sta nda
rd is the bur den gen era lly
imposed in civil liti gat ion . See
Riv era v. Minnich, 107
S.Ct. 3001, 3003 (1987) (footn
ote omitted) ("[ t]h e prepon der anc e of the evidence sta
nda rd * * * is the sta ndard tha t is applied most fre que
ntl y in liti gat ion between
pri vat e par tie s in every sta te"
) ; id. at 3003 n.5 ( citi ng
E. Cleary, McCormick on Evi
dence 956 ( 3d ed. 198 4),
for the proposition tha t the pre
pon der anc e sta nda rd applies "to 'the gen era l run of issu
es in civil cas es' "); Herthe sam e; the cou rt of app eals
' imp osit ion of the clear and
convincing stan dar d finds no sup por
t wha teve r in this Cou rt's prec
eden ts.
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man & MacLean v. Hudaleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983).
The preponderanc e standard is typically applied even
when the defendant can lose his livelihood if the decision
goes against him, so long as the proceeding is civil rather
than criminal. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
The court of appeals' decision in this case to hold Price
Waterhouse to the clear and convincing standard cannot
be reconciled with this rule. The fact that the standard
was imposed upon the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, makes the error all the more egregious.11
In certain limited and unusual circumstances, the
Court has required the plaintiff in a civil proceeding to
prove his case by clear and convincing evidence. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination
of parental rights) ; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979) (civil commitment ); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (defamation ); Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 ( 1966) (deportation; Chaunt v.
United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) ( denaturalization) .i:2 In these cases this Court recognized that where
11 Because the ultimate
issue in discrimination cases will often
turn on the defendant's state of mind, the Court in Aikens analogized the factual questions at issue in such cases to those presented
in cases of misrepresentati on. 460 U.S. at 716. The law of fraud,
of course, has departed from the preponderance standard; but it did
so by requiring the plaintiff to prove his case by clear and convincing evidence. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at
388 n.27.

12 When a public body charged
with violating Title VII has a history of de jure segregation, it has been held appropriate to require
the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
challenged employment decision was made on the basis of raceneutral criteria. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209
(1973) (citing Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364
F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966) (en bane)). This rule, of course, is
entirely irrelevant in this case, because the district court did not
purport to find a past history of discrimination at Price Waterhouse. See Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917,
925-929 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining that, after Burdine, the Cham-
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a pla int iff seeks cer ta'i n
affirmative, coercive, int erv
en tions, the co urt s ma y deny
the ir aid unless the int erv
en
tio n is shown to be wa rra
nte d un de r a rig oro us evi
dentia ry sta nd ard . Bu t in thi
s case such an ev ide nti ary
sta nd ard wa s imposed on
a defendant who is resist
ing
the imposition of coercive
go ve rnm en tal sanctions. Gi
ven
the Co urt 's insistence tha t
Tit le VI I cases are no t dif
feren t fro m oth er pri va te rig
hts of action, it is a sta rtl
ing
ste p in the wrong direction
to say to a Tit le VI I defend
an t tha t it will be deemed
to ha ve violated the law, an
d
will thu s be sub jec t to san
ctions, unless it can show
by
cle ar an d convincing eviden
ce tha t it wa s no t gu ilty
of
int en tio na l discrimination.
D. The Court Of Appeals
Evaded Th is Court's Decis
ion
In Bu rdi ne By Improper
ly Characterizing This Ca
se
As One Involving "Mixed
Motives."

W ith vir tua lly no sup po rti
ng precedent, the co urt of
appeals in thi s case adopte
d an approach to the bu rde
n
of proof issue tha t makes
it essentially impossible for
an employer to win a Tit
le VI I case of thi s type.
No t
only did the co urt place
the bu rde n on the de fen da
nt
employer to prove a ne ga
tiv e-t ha t an im pro pe r mo
tiv
e
wa s no t the de ter mi na tiv e
fac tor in the adverse emplo
yme nt ac tio n- bu t it also
required thi s showing to
be
accomplished by the ex tra ord
ina ry sta nd ard of cle ar an
d
convincing evidence. More
sta rtl ing still, these Dr aco nia
n
rul es were applied in a
context where the ev ide nti
ary
record failed wholly to pro
vide a fai r an d plausible ba
sis
bers doc trin e is app lica ble
only in pat ter n or pra ctic e
and dis par ate
imp act cas es) . See also Lov
e v. Ala ma nce Co unt y Bd.
of Educ., 757
F.2 d 1504, 1508-1510 (4t h
Cir . 1985) (ex pla ini ng the
kin d of de jur e
seg reg atio n a pub lic body
mu st have imposed bef ore
the Chambers
doc trin e becomes rel eva nt)
. Given the dis tric t cou rt's
rej ect ion in
thi s cas e of all of Ho pki ns'
com par ativ e evidence, the
dis cus sio n in
Ala ma nac e Co unt y ma kes
cle ar tha t Ho pki ns could
not hav e sat isfied the req uir em ent s it
imposes even if she had
sou ght to app ly
the doc trin e her e.

;
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for the conclusion that impermissible motives in fact
played a significant causal role at all in the employment
decision.
In this case the court of appeals did not disturb the
district court's findings that, first, Price Waterhouse had
established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual basis for its decision not to make Hopkins a partner; second, Hopkins had not proved that she would have
been made a partner in the absence of sex "stereotyping''; and third, a Title VII violation had occurred solely
because some participants in the evaluation process (but
not the actual decisionmakers themselves) had engaged
in unconscious and unquantifiable sex "stereotyping " and
because the firm had not taken steps to eliminate this
improper element from the environment.
The court of appeals then evaded Burdine by proceeding on this impalpable basis to characterize the case as
one where "mixed motives" were present and a shift in
the burden of proof therefore warranted. The difficulty
is that virtually any case can be transformed into one of
"mixed motives" on the showing made here.13 The Burdine rule, which unequivocally places the ultimate burden
13 As discussed above (pages
7-9, supra), Hopkins' expert witness reached her conclusion that various partners' statements were
reflections of sex "stereotyping," rather than accurate observations
drawn from direct contact with Hopkins, even though the witness
herself had never met Hopkins and had no knowledge whatever of
Hopkins' bevarior at Price Waterhouse. Moreover, as Judge Williams demonstrated in his dissent (App. 31a-36a), the handful of
statements upon which the expert relied for her "stereotyping" conclusion were, virtually without exception, either (1) made by Hopkins' supporters and therefore were unlikely to have adversely affected her partnership candidacy, or (2) made at a remote time and
about other women who did become partners, or (3) made by persons outside the decisionmaking chain, so that no adverse effect on
Hopkins could have occurred, and/or ( 4) made in a fashion so that
the implications of the statements were either utterly benign or,
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of persu asion in discri minat ion cases upon the plaintiff,
will be effectively swallowed up by the "mixed-motive"
exception; and the rule's evisceration is completed by the
imposition upon the employer of the clear and convincing
evide ntiary stand ard.
Even if, in limited circumstances, a soundly based
"mixed-motive" analysis is appro priate and consistent
with Burdine, guidance from this Court is urgen tly
needed concerning its prope r scope. In the absence of
such guidance, Burdine will simply disap pear in a sea
of "find ings" of mixed motives. Partic ularly where, as
here, the clear and convincing burde n is placed upon the
employer, the employer will have no oppor tunity fairly to
contest Title VII cases based on the rules adopted by
Congress as interp reted by this Court.
This Court has, in other contexts, had to deal with the
problem of erosion in the general requi remen t of the
legal system that findings may not be validated on the
basis of "expe rt" intuit ions in the absence of fair and
subst antial suppo rt in the record as a whole. Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB , 340 U.S. 474 (1951 ); and see
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Questions of Fact, 69 Harv. L.
Rev. 1020 ( 1956) . Such erosion will certai nly take place
here in the absence of firm insistence by this Court that a
finding of a Title VII violation must be based, at a minimum, on a fair and subst antial showing in the record as
a whole that the disputed employment decision was in
fact caused by illegal discrimination, and that radic al
at worst, ambig uous, requir ing a health y imagin ation to
assign illicit motiva tion to them. For example, the only supposedly
stereotypic remar k made by a partne r who actual ly oppose
d Hopki ns'
partne rship candid acy consis ted of a sugges tion that
she should
take a "cours e at charm school." Id. at 6a, 33a. As Judge
Willia ms
observed, this remar k was simply a "silly phrase " inserte
d in a
much length ier substa ntive comm ent that describ ed Hopki
ns' difficult person ality in terms that had "nothi ng to do with
sex stereotypes. " Id. at 33a. See also note 4, supra.

shifts in the placement and content of the burden of
proof, themselves triggered almost entirely on the basis
of intuitive speculations rather than on findings as to
the employer's actual motives, cannot substitute for such
a showing.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
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Opinion for the Cour t filed by Distr ict Judge JOYC E
HEN S GREE N.
Disse nting opinion filed by Circu it Judge WILLIAMS.
JOYC E HEN S GREE N, Distr ict Judge :
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct.
2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 ( 1984) , the Supreme Cour t ruled
for the first time that decisions concerning advancement
to partn ershi ps are governed by Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and must there fore be made without regar d to race, sex, religion, or natio nal origin. This
case, the first challenge to a partn ershi p denial to reach
us since Hishon, prese nts several novel and impo rtant
questions that arise from the application of feder al employment discri minat ion law to collegial bodies such as
partn ership s. Following a five-day trial, the Distr ict
Court found that Price Waterhouse, one of the natio n's
large st accounting firms, had discri minat ed again st plain tiff Ann Hopkins by perm itting stereotypical attitu des
towar d women to play a significant, though unquantifiable, role in its decision not to invite her to become a
partn er. The court concluded that Hopkins was entitl ed
to an awar d of backpay from the date she should have
been elected partn er until the date of her resign ation
seven months later, but ruled that, notwi thstan ding the
partie s' agree ment to defer consideration of damages until after a decision on the issue of liability, Hopkins'
failur e to prese nt any evidence as to the amou nt of compensation she was due barre d her from recovering all
damages save attorn eys' fees. The trial court furth er
found that Hopkins had failed to establish that she had
been constructively discharged following Price Wate rhouse's failur e to make her a partn er, and thus declined
to award her backpay for the period subsequent to her
resign ation or to order Price Wate rhous e to invite her
to become a partn er. The partie s cross-appealed? For
partie s
For the sake of convenience, the court will refer to• the
,
ppellee
cross-a
ant,
appell
than
as plainti ff and defend ant, rather
nt.
and appellee, cross-a ppella
1
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the reasons set forth below, we affirm the District Court's
determinat ion of liability, but reverse its judgment as to
the appropriat e relief and remand for further proceedings
on this issue.
I.
A. Background
Price Waterhous e is a professional partnershi p specializing in auditing, tax, and manageme nt consulting
services, primarily for private corporations and government agencies. The firm is known colloquially as one of
the nation's "big eight" accounting firms; at the time
this suit commenced, it had 662 partners working in 90
offices across the country. Price Waterhouse is managed
by a Senior Partner and Policy Board elected by all the
partners. New partners are regularly drawn from the
ranks of the firm's senior managers through a formai
nomination and review process that culminates in a
partnershi p-wide vote. There are no formal limits on
the number of persons who may be made partners in any
one year. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp.
1109, 1111 (D.D.C.1985).
Plaintiff joined Price Waterhouse as a manager in
August 1978 and began working in its Office of Government Services (OGS) in Washington, D.C. She specialized
in preparing, securing, and managing contracts for largescale computer-based systems designed specifically for government agencies. Plaintiff had previously worked at
Touche Ross, another large accounting firm where her
husband was also employed, but left because that firm's
rules prohibited both husband and wife from being considered for partnershi p. Shortly after her departure,
plaintiff's husband became a partner at Touche Ross. In
order to hire her, Price Waterhous e waived one of its own
rules that barred employment of anyone whose spouse was
a partner in a competing firm. In 1981, however, the
firm advised plaintiff that, because of her husband's position at Touche Ross, she would not be eligible for
partnershi p at Price Waterhouse. She threatened to re-
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sign and the matter was resolved only because Hopkins'
husband left Touche Ross to set up his own consulting
firm. Plaintiff was nominated for partnership a year
later, in August 1982.
There is no dispute that Hopkins was qualified for
partnership consideration. She was exceptionally successful in garnering business for the firm, winning contract awards with the Department of :State and the
Farmers Home Administration worth an estimated $34
to $44 million to Price Waterhouse. The firm's Senior
Partner, Joseph Connor, characterized one of these
contracts. a world-wide computerized system capable of
handling all State Department financial transactions-as
a "leading credential" that enabled the firm to win similar business from other federal agencies. The District
Court expressly found that none of the other candidates
considered for partnership in 1983 had generated more
business for Price Waterhouse than plaintiff. 618 F.Supp.
at 1112. In addition, she billed more hours than any of
the other candidates under consideration.
The partners in OGS formally initiated the admission
process for plaintiff by nominating her for partnership
in August 1982. In support of her candidacy OGS submitted a flattering appraisal of her work, highlighting
her "outstanding performance" in connection with the
State Department project, and strongly urging her admission to the partnership. The appraisal stated in part:
In her five years with the firm, she has demonstrated
conclusively that she has the capacity and capability
to contribute significantly to the growth and profitability of the firm. Her strong character, independence and integrity are well recognized by her
clients and peers. Ms. Hopkins has outstanding oral
and written communication skills. :She has a good
business sense, and ability to grasp and handle
quickly the most complex issues, and strong leadership qualities.
Plaintiff's Exhibit ("Pl.Ex.") 15.
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After a local office such as OGS nominates one of its
senior managers for partnership, Price Waterhouse circulates the nominee's name and the accompanying appraisal of his or her work to all partners, who are
invited to comment on the candidate. Those partners
who have worked closely or extensively with a candidate
submit "long-form" evaluations, while those whose contact has been more limited submit "short-forms." Partners are asked to rank individual nominees against all
other candidates in 48 categories; to indicate whether the
individual should be admitted, rejected, or placed on hold;
and to provide written comments explaining their recommendations. The Admissions Committee, an arm of the
firm's Policy Board, reviews each candidate's personnel
file and occasionally interviews individual partners who
have commented on a given candidate. The Committee
then prepares a summary of the evaluations and makes
its own recommendations to the Policy Board, providing
a short written statement explaining any recommendation to hold or reject a candidate. The Policy Board in
turn votes on whether the candidate should be included
on the partnership ballot, held for reconsideration, or
rejected. The Board can override the recommendations of
the Admissions Committee and evaluates candidates not
only on the basis of their individual merit, but also in
terms of the firm's business needs. Those candidates who
receive the Board's approval are placed on the ballot for
a partnership-wide election; those who are not included
are informed of the Board's reasons for rejecting or postponing their candidacies.
Plaintiff was the only woman among the 88 candidates
nominated for partnership in August 1982. Of these, 4 7
were invited to join the partnership, 21 were rejected outright, and the remaining 20-including plaintiff-were
placed on hold. Seventeen of the 19 men placed on hold
were renominated the following year (the other two had
been placed on two-year holds), and of these, 15 were ultimately admitted. OGS, however, did not renominate plain-
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tiff. Of the thirty-tw o partners who submitted evaluations and comments on her candidacy, fully a fourth
opposed her admission; another three partners recommended that she be held for reconsideration; and eight
others stated that they lacked a sufficient basis upon
which to form an opinion. 618 F.Supp. at 1113. Many
of the comments from evaluating partners centered on
Hopkins' apparent _difficulties with staff, and both supporters and opponents of her candidacy characterized
her as sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, impatient with staff, and very demanding.
A number of these complaints about plaintiff's lack
of "interper sonal skills" were couched in terms of her
sex. One critic suggested that Hopkins needed to take
a "course at charm school." Pl.Ex. 21. A supporte r sought
to excuse her behavior by speculating that "she may have
overcompensated for being a woman." Defenda nt's Exhibit ("Def.Ex .") 31. A member of the Admissions
Committee investigated a reference in Hopkins' personnel
file about her use of profanity and testified that "several
... partners " regarded her language as "one of the negatives." Transcri pt of Trial ("Tr.") 321. One supporter
felt compelled to defend her on this subject, arguing that
"[m] any male partners are worse than Ann (language
and tough personality) " ; this partner believed that the
concerns over her profanity arose only "because she is a
lady using foul language." Id. Another supporte r opined
that Hopkins initially came across as "macho," but concluded that "if you get around the personality thing she's
at the top of the list or way above average." Still another
supporter wrote that plaintiff "had matured from a toughtalking, somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady
partner candidate." Pl.Ex. 21.
Due to the large number of comments concerning her
interpersonal skills, the Admissions Committee recommended that Hopkns' candidacy be held for at least a
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year. The Policy Board concurred, noting that although
plaintiff had "a lot of talent," she needed "social grace."
Pl.Ex. 20. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff met with the firm's
Senior Partner, Joseph Connor, to discuss the Board's
decision, and he urged her to undertake a Quality Control Review, which would allow her to work with more
partners, demonstrate her skills, and allay concerns about
her ability to deal with staff. Prior to that meeting,
Thomas Beyer, the head partner at OGS and perhaps
Hopkins' most fervent supporter, discussed with her
problems the Board had identified with her candidacy
and the steps she might take to enhance her partnership prospects. Beyer advised her "to walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."
618 F.Supp. at 1117.
Four months after she embarked on her Quality Control Review, however, the partners at OGS decided not
to propose Hopkins for partnership. During the year
following her initial nomination, Hopkins lost the support of two of these partners, who had come to strongly
oppose her candidacy. Although candidates have on occasion been admitted despite the opposition of partners
in their home offices, plaintiff's supporters at OGS felt
that in view of the strong criticisms her earlier nomination had drawn, she could not possibly become a partner
without the unanimous endorsement of her local office
partners. Beyer advised plaintiff that it was very unlikely that she would ever be admitted to the partnership.
He told her that she could remain at Price Waterhouse
as a senior manager, but one of the OGS partners who
opposed her candidacy advised her to resign. That advice
was consistent with the regular practice and custom at
Price Waterhouse, where candidates rejected for partnership routinely left. Hopkins resigned in January 1984
and set up her own consulting firm.
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Proceedings Below
The District Court had no difficulty finding that plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of sex discrimin ation: she was a qualified partners hip candidat e, she was
rejected, and Price Waterho use continued to seek partners with her qualifications. 618 F.Supp. at 1113 ( citing
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 875, 104
S.Ct. 2794, 2799, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 ( 1984) ; Texas Department of Commun ity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ( 1981) ) . The
court went on to find, however, that Price Waterho use's
consideration of Hopkins', or any other candidat e's, interperson al skills was a legitimat e business inquiry, and
that plaintiff' s managem ent style "provided ample justification for the complaints that formed the basis of the
Policy Board's decision." 618 F.Supp. at 1114. The trial
judge found that a number of the criticism s leveled at
Hopkins because of her treatmen t of staff were in fact
genuine. Id. In addition, the trial court concluded that
the opposition of the two OGS partners to Hopkins' renomination was likewise based on genuine reservati ons
about her managem ent style rather than any animosit y
towards her because of her sex. Id. Finally, the District
Court rejected Hopkins' contention that Price Waterhouse treated her differently than male candidat es with
abrasive or aggressive personalities. The trial judge concluded that the firm had legitimate, nondiscr iminator y
business reasons for admittin g two such candidat es identified by plaintiff, and dismissed evidence she proffered
as to the two other male candidat es as "fragme ntary"
2
and otherwise insufficient proof of disparate treatmen t.
Id. at 1115 & n. 6.
B.

2 The District Court also rejected Hopkins' evidence concerning
the very small number of female partners at Price Waterhous e.
The trial court found this evidence "wholly inconclusive" because
it failed to indicate the percentage of female partners relative to
the percentage of available qualified women, and failed to take
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The trial court's finding of liability rested instead on
its determinatio n that Price Waterhouse had discriminated against Hopkins by filtering her partnership candidacy through a system that gave great weight to negative comments and recommendations, despite evidence
that those comments reflected unconscious sexual stereotyping by male evaluators based on outmoded attitudes
towards women. Id. at 1118-19. The District Court found
that comments based on sexual stereotypes were "part
of the regular fodder of partnership evaluations," yet
Price Waterhouse took no steps to discourage sexism, to
heighten the sensitivity of partners to sexist attitudes,
or to investigate negative comments to ascertain whether
they were the product of such attitudes. Id. at 1119.
The trial judge acknowledged that it was impossible to
measure the precise role sexual stereotyping had played
in the Policy Board's decision to deny Hopkins partnership, but found that the decision was in fact tainted by
discriminato ry evaluations that resulted from the firm's
failure to root evident sexism from its evaluation system.
Accordingly, the District Court determined that Price
Waterhouse bore the burden of demonstratin g by clear
and convincing evidence that its decision would have been
the same regardless of such discriminati on-a showing
the firm was unable to make.
Having concluded that Hopkins was a victim of sexual
discriminatio n, the trial judge went on to find that she
was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing the
firm to make her a partner. Applying the doctrine of
constructive discharge to the professional partnership
setting, the District Court determined that Hopkins' departure from Price Waterhouse was the result of neither
intolerable working conditions nor any aggravating cirinto account the fact that female partners presently at Price
Waterhouse were selected over a long span of years during which
the pool of qualified women changed dramatically. Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 618 F . Supp. 1109, 1116 (D.D.C. 1985).
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lla
that there is no competent evidence support ing the lower
court's finding that impermissible sexual stereotyping
infected the partner ship evaluation system. Second, Price
Waterhouse argues that even if this finding is upheld, the
liability determi nation still cannot stand because the
lower court expressly found that Hopkins' behavior provided "ample justification" for the complaints about her
lack of interper sonal skills, and that these complaints
in turn constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for placing Hopkins' candidacy on hold.
Thus, the firm submits that even if the evaluation process has not been purged of sexist attitude s, those attitudes were not responsible for the decision to hold Hopkins for further consideration, and therefo re Hopkins
has failed to establish any causation between the partnership 's inappro priate treatme nt of female candidates
and her own unsuccessful candidacy.
1. The District Court's Findings

As this court recently emphasized, appellate review of
District Court findings in Title VII cases is necessarily
narrow. Underwood v. District of Columbia Armory
Board, 816 F.2d 769, 774 (D.C.Cir.1987). In order to
overtur n a determi nation of liability, we must conclude
that it is "'based on an utterly implausible account of
the evidenc e.'" Id. (quoting Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C.Cir.1986)). Faced with
this formidable hurdle, Price Waterhouse eschews any intention of re-argu ing its case on appeal: it purport s to
urge reversal not on the ground that the lower court's
view of the evidence is implausible, but on the theory
that there simply is no evidence support ing the District
Court's finding of discrimination. Notwith standin g its
disclaimer, however, defendant's attempt to demonstrate
the absence of competent evidence proves, upon closer
inspection, to be nothing more than a thinly disguised
quarrel with the District Court over appropr iate inferences to be drawn from the evidence before it. Given
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suppo rters may or may not have harm ed her candidacy,S
but they are most certai nly competent evidence that sexis t
attitu des were prese nt in the partn ershi p selection process. Price Wate rhous e also sugge sts that one partn er's
comment that Hopkins needed to take a "course at charm
school" is not sex-indicative, because charm is a qualiity
admir ed both in men and women. This argum ent borde rs
on the facetious. Charm is indeed an attrib ute prized in
men and women alike, but charm schools4 are and always
have been exclusively female instit ution s. The sexist import of the comment is paten tly clear, partic ularly as
charm schools are inexitricably linked, both historically
and philosophically, with the antiq uated notion thait
women should devote their energ ies to social and cultu ral
affair s rathe r than business or professional endeavors.
See note 4 supra.
Perha ps most tellin g is Price Wate rhous e'•s desperate
attem pt to erase from the record Thomas Beyer's advice
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to Hopkins that she should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair .styled, and wear jewelr y." 618 F.Supp. at
1117. The firm argue s that the Distri ct Court erred in
statin g that Beyer was "responsible for telling her what
problems ithe Policy Board had identified with her candidacy." Id. Price Water house claims that this task
officially fell to the firm's Senio•r Partn er, Joseph Connor,
who made no reference to Hopkins' femin inity in his
meeting with her following the Policy Board 's decision
to hold her candidacy. This contention not only rests
on the artificial assumption ,tha;t Beyer, the chief partn er
in Price Water house 's Washington office and Hopkins'
leading suppo rter, would be kept completely in the dark
as to the Policy Board 's views on her candidacy, but is
directly contra dicted by the testimony of Roger Marcellin,
a member of both the Policy Board and the Admissions
Committee at the time of Hopkins' nomination, who
stated that he had "no doubt that Tom Beyer would be
the one that would have to talk with her [Hopk ins]. He
knew exactly where the problems were." Tr. 316. Beyer's advice, of course, speak s for itself. That he arden tly
suppo rted her candidacy and had every motive to give
her what he hoped would be helpful counsel simply under scores the genuineness of his belief that Hopkins' failur e
to behave in a mann er appar ently expected of a woman
by Price Water house partne rs had damaged her partne rship bid.
The Distri ct Court also rested its finding of discriminator y sexual stereo typing on the testimony of Dr. Fiske,
an exper t in the field of stereotyping, who stated that the
disappointed stereotypical expectations of male partne rs
played a "majo r determ ining role" in the firm's decision
not to make Hopkins a partne r. Tr. 545. Disclaiming any
intent ion of denig rating Dr. Fiske' s field of expertise,
Price Water house attem pts to dismiss this evidence as
"sheer speculation" of "no eviden tiary value." Brief for
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Appellee-Cross Appellant at 31. This is so, the firm contends, because Dr. Fiske failed to compare the stereotypical comments made about Hopkins with similar comments made abourt male candidates; she lacked information concerning the authors of these comments; and she
had never met Hopkins and had no idea what her conduct
or behavior was like. However useful Price Waterhouse
might believe this information to be, Dr. Fiske made clear
that experts in her field do not require such data in order
to determine whether stereotyping is occurring in a given
employment context. Dr. Fiske testified that she was an
expert at ,e valuating written comments, that reliance on
such written documents was a standard practice in her
field, and that she did not need to observe Hopkins o•r
meet her critics because she had the entire universe of
reaetions to Hopkins before her, as well as comments the
same partners made about male candidates. Tr. 595-96.
This information, along with other "convergent indicators" or stereotyping-such as 1the e~tremeiy small number of female partners at the firm; the absence of any
other female candidates among the 88 nominated along
with Hopkins; the exaggerated and extremely intense
negative reactions of Hopkins' critics to behavior that
supporters perceived as positive; the ambiguous criteria
the firm used to evaluate a candidate's personal qualities;
the abs.ence of complaints from Hopkins' clients; and the
positive assessments of Hopkins in areas where performance could be measured objectively, (e.g., business generaition) ----itaken together provided Dr. Fiske a sufficient
basis from which to draw her conclusions that Hopkins
was the victim of stereotyping. To the extent that Price
Waterhouse believes Dr. Fiske lacked necessary information, the firm is in fact ,q uarreling with her field of expertise and the methodology it employs. Defendant, however, failed to challenge the validity of Dr. Fiske's discipline at trial and disavows any such challenge here.
We cannot find any error in the District Court's decision
to credit Dr. Fiske's testimony as that of an expert, or
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the decision to rely on that testimony as evidence of
sexual stereotyping at Price Waterhouse.
Finally, the firm challenges- the District Court's reliance on comments. partners made about other female
candidates, contending that the trial judge intentionally
mis-construed these statements in order to find in them
evidence of stereotypical thinking. One partner stated
that he could never vote for a f emaie partner. One successful female candidate was criticized for being a "women's libber," and two other unsuccessful women were
characterized as curt, brus.que, and abrasive; "Ma Barker"; and "one of the boys." 618 F.Supp. at 1117. It is
of course impossible to misconstrue the sentiment behind
a categorical opposition to all female partnership candidates. Despite the fact that the firm took no steps to
admonish this partner for his statement, which he made
just one year before Hopkins came up for consideration,
Price Waterhouse suggests the comment is essentially irrelevant because it was obviously ignored by the Policy
Board and was "of no further concern . . . by the time
that plaintiff was proposed." Brief for Appellee-Cross
Appellant at 37. The firm also argues, that the comment
about one candidate being a "women's libber" cannot be
viewed as evidence of discrimination because the woman
in question became a partner; Price Waterhouse similarly attempts to dismiss the references describing one
woman as "Ma Barker" and "one of the boys" as comments utterly devoid of stereotypical attitudes, reflecting
nothing more than the author's view that this particular
woman was a "hick" who socialized too often with nonprofessional staff. Thes-e arguments- miss the mark. The
District Court did not purport to find that any of these
comments. determined the fate of the women in question,
reflected the views of the Policy Board itself, or had a
direct impact on plaintiff's candidacy. Rather, ,t he court
relied on them as evidence that partners at Price Waterhouse often evaluated female candidates in terms of their
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sex. We find nothing erroneo us in such reliance; on the
contrar y, we believe it is eminen tly correct.
In sum, there is ample support in the record for the
District Court's finding that the partner ship selection:
process at Price Waterh ouse was impermissibly infected
by stereotypical attitude s towards female candidates.
2. The District Court's Legal Theory

Price Waterh ouse also challenges the liability determinatio n below on two purely legal grounds . Firs,t, it
contends that Hopkins did not prove "intenti onal" discrimina tion on the part of the Policy Board, but only
"unconscious" sexual stereoty ping by unidentified partners who particip ated in the selection proces,s. Second, the
firm a,rgues that even if such a showing is sufficient to
satisfy Title VII's intent requirement, Hopkins did not
prove, and the District Court did n01t find, that this, unconscious stereoty ping, or the firm's conscious failure to
prevent it, actually caused her partner ship denial.
Hopkins claimed, and the District Court found, that
Price Waterh ouse treated her differen tly than the 87 male
candidait es nomina ted in 1982 by subjecti ng her candida cy
to :an evaluati on system that the firm knew or should have
known allowed sexual stereoty pes to influence decisions
on partner ship selection. She made a substan tial showing
of the role such sexual stereoty pes played in the selection
system general ly and in her own candida cy in particu lar
-a showing made all the more remarka ble by the educational backgro und and sophistication of the particip ants
in that system. Price Waterh ouse tries to escape liability
for this sex-based dispara te treatme nt by arguing that
i.t was not "intent ional"- the individu al partner s who
evaluat ed plaintif f on the basis of stereoty pes, did so, unconsciously, and plaintif f failed to show the extent to
which this stereoty ping influenced the ultimat e decisionmaker in this case, the Policy Board. In so arguing , defendant seeks refuge in the collegial nature of its decision-
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making body, in the subtle and insidious nature of the
discriminatio n involved, and in a mistaken notion of the
intent requirement in disparate treatment cases.
As the .Supreme Court noted a decade ago in Inter'"
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), disparate treatment is a type of intentional discriminatio n
whereby an "employer ,simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminato ry motive is crucial, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment."
Id. at 335-36 n. 15, 97 .S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15 (emphasis
added). Title VII is, of course, remedial rather than punitive in nature. It is designed to Temove " 'artificial,
arbitrary and unnecessary harriers to employment where
those barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification .'"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (quoting
Griggs v. Duke. Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct.
849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 ( 1971) ) . In keeping with this
purpose, the Supreme Court has never applied the concept of intent so as to excuse an artificial, gender-based
employment barrier simply because the employer involved
did not harbor the requisite degree of ill-will towards the
person in question. As the evidentiary framework established in McDonnell Douglas makes clear, the requirements of discriminator y motive in disparate treatment
cases does not function as a "state of mind" element, but
as a method of ensuring that only those arbitrary or
artificial employment barriers that are related to an employee or applicant's, race, sex, religion, or national origin
aTe eliminated.5 Nor is this surprising, as unwitting or
5 In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the Supreme Court noted
that an employer's erroneous assessment of a protected applicant's
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ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradica6
tion than blatant or calculated discrimination. Hopkins
demonstrated, and <the District Court found, that she was
treated less favorably than male candidates because of
her sex. This is sufficient to establish discrimina tory
motive; the fact that some or all of the partners at Price
Waterhous e may have been unaware of that motivation,
even within themselves, neither alters the fact of its existence nor excuses it. See Lynn v. Regents of the University
of California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n. 5 (9th Cir.1981)
( "when plaintiffs establish that decisions regarding . . .
employment are motivated by discrimina tory attitudes relating to race or sex, or are rooted in concepts which reflect such attitudes, however subtly, courts are obligated
to afford the relief provided by Title VII"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 823, 103 8.Ct. 53, 74 L.Ed.2d 59 (1982).
Price Waterhous e nevertheless argues that Hopkins has
failed to establish a discrimina tory motive on the part
of the actual decisionmaker in this case, the Policy Board,
because she has not demonstrated the exact impact that
stereotyped comments had on the Board's ultimate decision. The faulty logic upon which this contention is
qualification s does not, by itself, subject the employer to Title VII
liability. Such an assessment is of course an arbitrary employment
barrier, but it is not based on the applicant's race, sex, religion,
or national origin and is thus not within the scope. of the statute.
Id. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096.
In Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 656 F.2d
1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823, 103 S.Ct. 53, 74
L.Ed.2d 59 (1982), the Ninth Circuit observed that it was once
accepted wisdom that women were unfit to vote, practice law, or
undertake professional careers. These beliefs were no less pernicious merely because those subscribing to them may not have
suspected their own discriminato ry attitudes. Today "[o]ther
concepts reflect a discriminato ry attitude more subtly; the subtlety
does not, however, make the impact less significant or less unlawful.
It serves only to make the courts' task of scrutinizing attitudes
and motivation, in order to determine the true reason for employment decisions, more exacting." Id. at 1343 n.5.
6
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premised, however, would, if accepted, place an enormous,
perhaps insurmountable, burden on T'itle VII litigants
who challenge the employment decisions of collegial bodies
such as partnerships. It is the rare case indeed in which
a group of sophisticated professionals such as the Policy
Board would formally pass on the candidacy of a woman
or other member of a protected group in the unvarnished
terms of the Price Waterhouse partner who objected to
all female candidates as a matter of principle. Here,
Hopkins presented evidence that stereotypical attitudes
towards women had manifested themselves in connection
with the partnership bids of other women and, more importantly, that these stereotypes had been brought to
bear on her own candidacy. In addition, she offered the
expert testimony of Dr. Fiske, who concluded that these
attitudes played a "major" role in plaintiff's failure to
make partner. In particular, Dr. Fiske noted that these
stereotypical attitudes accounted for the extremely negative reactions of Hopkins' critics to behavior that other
partners praised in her-negativ e reactions, moreover,
which the Policy Board formally recognized in its recommendation by stating that plaintiff needed to learn social
grace. The District Court therefore had ample support
for its conclusion that stereotyping played a significant
role in blocking plaintiff's admission to the partnership.
In Burdine, of course, the Court made clear that ultimately the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the
issue of intentional discrimination. While the Court noted
that this burden requires the plaintiff to prove that "a
discriminato ry reason more likely motivated the employer," 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095, it has never
ruled definitively that the plaintiff must establish that
impermissible discrimination was the predominant or "but
for" motivating factor," and the circuits have divided on
7 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96
S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976), the Court stated in a footnote
that, for purposes of proving prete-xt, a Title VII plaintiff need
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the question. 8 McDonnell Douglas and Burdine set out the
not prove that race, was the, "sole" basis of the adverse employm ent
action, adding that "no more is required to be shown than that
race was a 'but for' cause." Id. at 282 n.10. Significa ntly, "[t]he
'no more need be shown' phrase indicates that a showing of but for
causation would be sufficient; it does not signify that such a showing is necessary to prevail." Lewis v. Universi ty of Pittsburg h, 725
F.2d 910, 921 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J., dissentin g), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 266, 83 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984) (emphasi s in
original ).· Neither the majority of circuit courts nor the commentator s that have addresse d the question have viewed the McDonald footnote, as definitive. See note 8 infra and Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 Col.L.Rev. 292, 302 (1982).
More recently, the Court ruled in an analogou s setting that for
purposes of establish ing an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, a showing that antiunion bias was a
substant ial or motivati ng factor in an adverse employm ent decision
is sufficient to shift to the employer the burden of proving that
the decision would have been the same even absent such bias.
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983). The
Court noted that in such mixed-m otive cases, "[i]t is fair that
[the] employer bear the risk that the influence, of legal and illegal
motives cannot be separated , because he knowingl y created the risk
and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by
his own wrongdo ing." Id. at 403, 103 S.Ct. at 2475.
Only two circuits have adopted the "but for" test of causation .
See Lewis v. Universi ty of Pittsburg h, 725 F.2d 910, 915-17 (3d
Cir. 1983) and Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720,
722 (1st Cir. 1977). Four others have adopted a "substan tial
factor" test under which race or sex need not be· the determin ative
factor, as long as it had a substant ial impact on the decision in
question. See Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712
(6th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must show employer 's decision "more
likely than not" motivate d by impermis sible criterion ) ; Miles v.
M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 n. 9 (11th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff
must show discrimi natory motive was "signific ant or substant ial
factor" in employm ent decision) ; Fadhl v. City and County of San
Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (liability may be
imposed on finding that sex was a "signific ant factor") ; Whiting v.
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) (discrim ination must be a "signific ant factor"). The Eighth Circuit has
8
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analytical framework necessary to establish intentional
discrimination when there is no direct evidence of such
discrimination and, consistent with this analysis, it is
inappropriate to require the defendant, simply on the
basis of the inference of discrimination raised by plaintiff's prima facie case, to prove that discrimination was
not the but for cause of the challenged employment decision. See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (D.C.
Cir.1983). Here. however, Hopkins has offered direct
evidence that her gender was a significant motivating
factor in her failure to make partner, and Price Waterhouse's claim that it had other legitimate reasons for its
decision in no way negates her showing. At this point,
the utility of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis is
at an end, for the question is no longer whether plaintiff
was "treat[ed] . . . less favorably than others because
of ... [her] sex," Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n. 15,
97 S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15, but rather whether that less favorable treatment in fact caused the adverse decision she
challenges.
Recognizing that "[d] iscriminatory intent is simply
not amenable to calibration," Personnel Administra.tor v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2295, 60 L.Ed.
2d 870 ( 1979), courts have struggled to resolve the difficult questions of causation that arise in mixed-motive
cases such as this. While most circuits have not confronted the question squarely, the consensus among those
that have is that once a Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated by direct evidence that discriminatory animus
played a significant or substantial role in the contested
employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer
adopted an even less stringent standard that permits a plaintiff to
establish Title VII liability simply by showing that an unlawful
motive "played some part in the employment decision." Bibbs v.
Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (emphasis
added). This circuit has not yet resolved the question. See American Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA, 716 F.2d 47,
51 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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to show that the decision would have been the same absent
discrimination. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d
703, 712 (6th Cir.1985) (where plaintiff shows by preponderance of evidence that decision more likely than not
motivated by impermissible criterion, burden shifts to
employer to show decision would have been the same);
Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 n. 9 (11th Cir.
1985) ( if plaintiff offers direct evidence that discrimination was substantia l factor in decision, burden shifts to
employer to show decision would have been the same
absent discrimina tion) ; see also Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d
1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir.1985) (en bane) (once plaintiff
shows unlawful motive played some part in decision, liability is established; defend ant may limit relief by showing decision would have been the same absent discrimination); Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741
F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff shows
unlawful motive was a significant factor, liability is
established; defendant may limit relief by demonstra ting
decision would have been the same absent discrimina tion).
But see Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910,
915-16 (3d Cir.1983) (plaintiff must show discrimina tory
animus was the but for cause of decision), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 266, 83 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984). We
believe that where a Title VII plaintiff has already discharged her burden of demonstra ting that the employment decision was based on impermissible bias,
it is unreasonable and destructive of the purposes of
Title VII to require the plaintiff to establish in addition the difficult hypothetical proposition that, had
there been no discrimination, the employment decision would have been made in [her] favor. We chose
instead to place the burden upon the employer to
show, by "clear and convincing evidence," that the
unlawful factor was not the determinat ive one.
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Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis in original).9
This, of course, is precisely the rule the District Court
applied below. We believe this burden-shifting mechanism
is appropriately invoked in a mixed-motive case such as
this, and accordingly we find no error in the District
Court's allocation of burdens.
Finally, Price Waterhouse argues that the District
Court's findings conclusively demonstrate that Hopkins'
unappealing personality, rather than any unlawful discrimination on the part of the Policy Board, was the but
for cause of her failure to make partner. The trial judge
expressly noted that the concerns raised over Hopkins'
dealings with staff found support in the record and "provided ample justification for the complaints that form the
basis of the Policy Board's decision." 618 F.Supp. at
1114. Moreover, the judge acknowledged that because of
Hopkins' apparent lack of interpersonal skills, "the Court
cannot say that she would have been elected to partnership if the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted
by sexually biased evaluations." Id. at 1120. Contrary to
Price Waterhouse's contentions, however, these statements
are not inconsistent with the court's liability determinaIn Toney, the court declined to apply this test, originally set
out in Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976), to an individual claim of disparate treatment. The court noted that the
Day v. Mathews test was typically applied in disparate, impact
class actions in which the class plaintiffs prevailed simply by
showing generalized discrimination in the employment unit,
without demonstrating that each individual class member had
actually suffered directly from that discrimination. In Toney,
the plaintiff, in accordance with Burdine, had relied on circumstantial evidence of discrimination "in the air" to prove his prima
facie case. As we noted above, in such circumstances it is inappropriate to shift to the employer the burden of proving that discrimination was not the determinative cause of the adverse decision. Here, however, Hopkins has shown by direct evidence not
just "background noise" of discrimination, but that "unlawful discrimination had been applied against [her] in the particular employment decision [at issue]." Toney, 705 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis
in original). As we explain above, this crucial finding justifies
the burden-shifting rule we apply in this case.
9
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tion. On the contrary, they are perfectly in keeping with
the fact that this is a case of mixed-motivation. The
District Court simply found that both plaintiff's personality and the sexually stereotyped reactions to her personality were significant factors in the firm's decision to
hold her candidacy. Because Price Waterhouse could not
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that impermissible bias was not the determinative factor, however, the District Court properly found for Hopkins on
the question of liability.
B.

Relief

Turning to the question of relief, the District Court
found that Hopkins was entitled to recover backpay from
the date of her partnership denial until the date of her
resignation, but disallowed any such recovery because the
parties had attempted to bifurcate the trial and postpone
consideration of the issue of damages without the knowledge or consent of the court. With respect to post-designation damages, the District Court found that Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that she had been constructively discharged and therefore was ineligible both
for backpay subsequent to the date of her resignation and
an order directing that she be made a partner.
The facts Hopkins proffered in support of her constructive discharge claim are undisputed. She made clear
both at trial and during the course of her employment
with Price Waterhouse that consideration for partnership
was an absolute prerequisite for any job she would take.
Indeed, she left Touche Ross when her husband's successful partnership bid eliminated her own chances for partnership, and she threatened to resign in 1981 when Price
Waterhouse suggested that her husband's status as a
Touche Ross partner might preclude her consideration for
partnership at the firm. Nor does defendant take issue
in any way with the District Court's finding that following her initial failure to make partner and OGS's decision
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not to re-propose her, it was "very unlikely" that Hopkins
would ever become a partner at Price Waterhouse. It is
true that plaintiff could have stayed on at the firm as a
senior manager and that at least one partner urged her
to do so. On the other hand, the customa ry and nearly
unanimous practice at Price Waterhouse, as at most
other accounting firms, is for senior manager s who have
been passed over for partnersh ip to resign, and one of the
OGS partners who strongly opposed Hopkins' candidacy
advised her to do just that.
In ruling that this showing did not suffice to make out
a claim of constructive discharge, the District Court
relied on Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1981),
where this court stated that in order to prevail on such a
claim, an employee must establish that the employer
"delibera tely made . . . working conditions intolerable
and drove [the employee] into 'an involunt ary quit.'"
Id. at 1176 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union Local
880 v. National Labor Relations Board, 419 F.2d 329,
332 (D.C.Cir.1969) ). We agree that taken at face value,
this language sets forth a stringen t standard . We believe
that the District Court's literal interpret ation of that
language was misplaced, however, in view of the underlying facts in Clark, as well as decisions in cases following it. To begin with, a number of cases, including one
relied upon by this court in Clark, have rejected the
notion that the employer must have the specific intent of
forcing the employee to quit. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon
Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir.1984) ;
Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir.1982 );
Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufac turing Co., 617 F.2d
61, 66 (5th Cir.1980). These courts have instead held
that it is sufficient if the employer simply tolerates discriminat ory working conditions that would drive a reasonable person to resign. In addition, Clark and cases subsequent to it reveal that the intolerableness of working
conditions is very much a function of the reasonable expectations of the employee, including expectations of
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promotion or advancement. Thus, in Clark, the court
noted that the plaintiff, like Hopkins here, "reasonably
expected . . . opportunities for advancement" and that
the employer's actions "essentially locked [her] into a
position from which she could apparently obtain no relief." 665 F.2d at 1174. Similarly, in Parrett v. City of
Connersville Indiana, 737 F.2d 690 (7th Cir.1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1145, 105 S.Ct. 828, 83 L.Ed.2d 820
(1985), the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiff's transfer, without loss of pay, from chief of detectives to line
captain, a dead-end position requiring plaintiff to do
virtually nothing, was a form of enforced idleness both
humiliating and detrimental to a person with the career
goals and ambition of the plaintiff. And in Goss, the
Third Circuit upheld a district court's finding that an
employer's discriminatory transfer of plaintiff to a less
lucrative sales territory, combined with its indifferent
response to her protests of that action, so debilitated and
humiliated her that it amounted to a constructive discharge. 747 F.2d 885. In each of these cases there were,
of course, other indicia of discriminatory animus, but that
is equally true here, where Hopkins faced the prospect of
working with a number of partners, including two in her
own office, who considered her brusque, abrasive, masculine, and overly aggressive.
We continue to adhere to the view, first s.et forth in
Clark, that the mere fact of discrimination, without more,
is insufficient to make out a claim of constructive discharge. Similarly, we believe that discrimination is still
best attacked within the context of existing employment
relations. Price Waterhouse's decision to deny Hopkins
partnership status, however, coupled with the OGS's failure to renominate her, would have been viewed by any
reasonable senior manager in her position as a careerending action. Accordingly, it amounted to a constructive dis.charge. We believe the District Court erred in
ruling otherwise and rtherefore reverse that portion of its
decision and remand the case so that the court may con-
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duct further proceedings in order to determine the appropriate relief.
In assessing Hopkins' post-resignation damages, the
District Court must of necessity consider much if not all
of the evidence plaintiff sought to introduce in connection
with her claim for backpay for the period between her
partners hip denial and her resignation. We believe, therefore, that ithe District Court, in determin ing damages on
remand, should also compensate Hopkins for this period.
In so ruling, we do not wish to condone unauthorized
bifureati on of Title VII or any other actions, nor are we
confident that we would require such a re-determination
were it not for our remand. The District Court itself,
however, expressly found that Hopkins was entitled to
recover pre-resignation damages, and there is no ;suggestion in the record that she wa:s in any way responsible
for the decision to postpone the presentation of ,evidence
in ithis issue. W,e are somewhat troubled by the fact that
the District Court's penalty for that decision fell solely
on plaintiff and resulted in a complete windfaII for Price
Waterhouse, whose attorney s joined equally in the unauthorized stipulation. In any event, the discourtesy and
inconvenience ,to the court occasioned by the stipulatio n
is largely moot in light of our remand, and we therefore
believe iit appropri ate for the court to award Hopkins the
full relief to which she is entitled.
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District
Court's liability determination and reverse and remand
the case for the determination of appropri ate damages
and relief.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority implicitly adopts a novel theory of liability under Title VII, but neither confronts the novelty
of the theory nor gives it any intelligible bounds. Further, as i,t must to reach the result, it bends out of recog-
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nition this court' s holding in Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d
1364 (D.C.Cir.1983). These prodigies are necessary for
the outcome because the distric t court' s judgm ent cannot
be sustai ned under any hither to accepted notion of Title
VII liability. 1
The theory is one of sexual stereotyping. See, e.g.,
Major ity Opinion ("Maj .") at 465, 468, 469. An analysis
groun ding Title VII liability in such stereotypes may well
be merito rious; but its articu lation would requir e care.
No one argue s that Congress intended entire ly to overturn Justic e Douglas's observation thart "the two sexes
are not fungible." BaJ,lard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187, 193, 67 S.Ct. 261, 264, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946). Dismissal of a male employee because he routinely appeared
for work in skirts and dresses would surely reflect a form
of sexual stereotyping, but it would not, merely on that
account, suppo rt Title VII liability. Nor, I suppose, does
anyone contend that use of the feminine pronoun "she"
to describe a female is a forbidden "evalu at [ion of] female candid ates in terms of their sex." Maj. at 468.
The court makes no effort to delineate the rtheory, to
draw a line between permissible and impermissible. There
is a good reason not rto do so: the Tecord here provided
no causal connection between Hopkins's fate and such
's 662
stereo typing as went on among Price Waterhous.e
2
careis
partne rs. The evidence of sexual stereotyping
fully culled from a mass of critica l comments on the
plaint iff's abrasiveness with no sex link whatever. The
distric t court determined that these comments were well
founded in fact, represented standa rds applied to men
and women alike, and were ,t he true basis of the firm's
The majori ty's treatm ent of the relief issues, however, seems
correct .
2 The line betwee n legally permis sible and legally imperm issible
stereot yping has yet to be drawn. When I use· the term, I refer
the
simply to whatev er express ions have been so charact erized by
distric t court or the majori ty.
1
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decision. 618 F.Supp. at 1114-16. The questionable re~
marks consist, with one marginal exception, of two types.
First, some of Hopkin's supporters used such stereotyp es
in speaking of her or in voicing their speculations as to
the workings of her opponents' minds. Second, other partners had used such terms in other years in speaking of
other female candidates. Thus, though some forms of
sexual stereotyp ing can be discrimin atory, the instances
here, however they may be characterized, were at most
"generalized discrimination within rthe employment unit,"
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1367, rather than discrimination "in the particular employment decision for which
retroactive relief was sought," id. at 1366 (emphasis in
original) .
Under Texas Department of Commun ity Affa.i rs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67
L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and Toney, this, can do no more
than establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In
functional terms, it put upon the defendan,t the burden
of showing that its stated reasong, were not pretextua l.
Defenda nt met that burden. The district court made unchallenged findings ithat the reasons given were "not
fabricate d as a pretext for discrimin ation." 618 F.Supp.
at 1114. It also found that Price Waterho use had "legitimate, nondiscr iminator y reasons for distingui shing between the plaintiff and the male partners with whom she
compares herself." Id. at 1115. This clearly restored the
burden to plaintiff ,t o show that she was the victim of
unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101
S.Ct. at 1095. The district court's findings that Hopkins's
"conduct provided ample justification for .t he complaints
[about her unpleasantness] that formed ithe basis of the
Policy Board's decision," 618 F.Supp. at 1114, clearly
shows that plaintiff did not meet that burden.
The district court summarized its view of the evidence
of discrimination in thes,e terms:
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Discriminaitory stereotyp ing of females was permitted to play a part. [1] Comments influenced by
sex stereotypes were made by partners ; [2] the firm's
evaluation process gave substant ial weight to these
comments; and [3] the partners hip failed to address
the conspicuous problem of stereotyp ing in partnership evaluations. [ 4] While these three factors might
have been innocent alone, they combined to produce
discrimin ation in 1the case of this plaintiff.
618 F.Supp. at 1120. I examine these elements, in the
same order.
1. Partner comments influenced by stereotypes. The
bulk of the comments instanced as stereotyped are by
Hopkins' s supporte rs. One said that opponents focused on
Hopkins' profanity "because iit s [sic] a lady using foul
language ," another character ized her as "macho," and
another said she had "matured from :a tough-talking,
somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to an authorita tive,
formidable, but much more appealin g lady partner candidaite." Id. at 1117. The majority evidently refers to
these as "stereoty pes . .. brought to bear on [Hopkins's]
own candidacy," Maj. at 469, but there is no reason to
suppose they harmed it.11 The psychological speculations
of Hopkins' s boosters cannot by any stretch be "direct
evidence that her gender was a significant motivati ng factor in her failure to make partner." Id. at 470.
As for the "smoking gun" remark by her most a•r dent
supporte r, Thomas Beyer ( "walk more femininely," etc.),
there is no reason to suppose that it represen ted any
more than one partner's speculations. The district court
was clearly erroneous, in characte rizing the statemen t as
having been made by Beyer in fulfillment of his "responsib [ility] for telling her what problems the Policy Board
had identified with her candidacy." 618 F.Supp. at 1117.
3

Cf. Maj. at 466 ("The, comments of Hopkins' supporters may

or may no.t have harmed her candidacy ....")
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Hopkins's own testimony showed that it was Joseph Connor (Beyer's superio r) who bore the responsibility for
inform ing Hopkins of the reasons for the decision and
who did so. Tr. at 87-97. Hopkins testified that Connor
made no remark s about her sex. Id. at 95. After speaking with Connor she sought Beyer's advice, along with
that of severa l other partne rs. Id. at 98. Beyer had
been on vacation, and he made no claim whatev er to inside inform ation on the discussions of the Policy Board:
he and Hopkins "tried ito guess who some of the [ opposing partne rs] might be." Id. at 89 (emphasis added) .
Neithe r her account of that conversation nor any part of
her tesitimony contra dicts the natura l inferen ce that his
advice was just that: personal speculation as to possibly
winnin g strateg ies. Id. at 102. Beyer' s testimo ny confirms this interpr etation : Connor had said nothin g to
Beyer sugges ting that Hopkins' dress, walk, or any aspect of her personal appear ance was a problem, but Beyer
believed such a change might help. Id. at 168. He never
articul ated the basis for the belief.
The majori ty tries to shore up the misconception by
imputi ng to Price Waterh ouse an "artific ial assump tion
that Beyer ... would be kept completely in ,t he dark as
to the Policy BoaTd's views on her candidacy." Maj. at
466. No one assumes any such thing. The issue is whethe r
Beyer was summa rizing the Policy Board' s views or was
offering his own helpful suggestions. The evidence of
Hopkins and Beyer is clear that it was the latter. The
only faint evidence the other way came from Roger Marcellin, a partne r in anothe r office who did field work for
the Policy Board. 'T r. at 305-07. He simply assume d
( "ha [d] no doubt" ) that Beyer would be reporti ng
"where the problems were." Id. ait 316. Beyer' s 1a nd
Hopkins's testimo ny on the subjec t makes clear that Marcellin's guesswork was inaccu rate.
In the majori ty's most drama tic imagin ative leap, the
stereotyped langua ge of Hopkins's suppor ters is said,
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without a shred of supportive evidence, to have "len [t]
credence to [stereotyped complaints of Hopkins's critics]
and unwittingly undermin [ed] the support they sought
to provide." Maj. at 466 n.3. The creativity of the proposition is underscored by its building in an assumption
that stereotyped critiques by Hopkins's opponents existan assumption for which the majority identifies no record
suppo.11t.
The only remark by a Hopkins opponent that can be
characterized as manifesting sexual stereotyping is, the
facetious suggestion that she should take a "course at
charm school." The smoke from this gun seems to me
rather wispy. It was embedded in the following comment:
Contacts with Ann are only casual-several mtgs at
OGS and MMGS sessions. However, she is consistently annoying and irritating-believes she knows
more than anyone about anything, is not afraid to let
the world know it. Suggest a course at charm school
before she is considered for admission. I would be
embarrassed to introduce her as a ptnr.
Def.Exh.27.
The substance of the remark has nothing to do with
sex stereotypes. It fits with the many other characterizations of Hopkins '("too assertive, overly critical of others,
impatient with her staff"; it required "diplomacy, patience and guts. to work with her"; 618 F.Supp. at 1114)
for which, the district court found, plaintiff's "conduct
provided ample justification," id. The objection, of course,
is 1to the opponent's silly phrase. The reference was doubtless sex-linked, and the majority is not unfair in characterizing it as a "somewhat derogatory colloquialism."
Maj. at 466 n. 4. Thus it may be more "sexist" than a
comment, such as might be made of a young man, wanting in character, that he ought to be "sent to military
school." But to find discrimination by Price Waterhouse
based simply on this remark is "utterly implausible." See
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Bishopp v. Distri ct of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C.
Cir.1986) ( discussing criter ia for disreg arding distric t
courts ' findings of fact in Title VII cases) .
The distric t courit and the major ity take refuge in
comments made by Price Water house partne rs in evalua tions of other women in other years. 618 F.Supp. at 1117;
Maj. at 467-468. These included one plainl y beyond the
pale-- a remar k by a partn er that he "could no,t consider
any woman seriously as a partne rship candid ate and believed that women were not even capable of functi oning
as senior manag ers." 618 F.Supp. at 1117. So we know
that, at least at some time in the past, there was one
male chauv inist pig rampa nt among the Price Water house partne rs. But there is no evidence that this troglodyte ever influenced a single other partne r. His comment
was not repeat ed after 1981, perha ps because the inform al
atmosphere in the firm made such remar ks unacceptable.
In any event, no one claims he played any role in the
releva nt evaluation.
The other remar ks (still relatin g to other evalua tions
in other years) are ambiguous. For instance, it had been
said of one woman candidafo that she acted too much
like "one of the boys," 618 F.Supp. at 1117, but this was
appar ently a critici sm of her for socializing too much
with the clerical staff and not enough with the professionals. Def.Exh. 64, tab 22. Even the major ity recognizes that these remar ks had no "direc t impac t on plaintiff's candidacy." Maj. at 468. But it takes them as evidence that partne rs at Price Water house "often evalua te
female candid ates in terms of their sex." Id.
In a case where alleged sexual stereo typing had a
demonstrable connection to the plaintiff, a carefu l analysis of such remar ks would be in order. Such an analys is
would begin with the recognition that not all sex-based
phrase s are sexist. Our vocabulary is full of such
phrases, some of which have gradu ally detached themselves from any genuin e link to sex, or even switched sex.
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Thus "doll," originally a slang phrase for a "conventionally pretty and shapely young woman, ... whose function is fo elevate the status of a male and to inspire general lust," see NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 108
(R. Chapman ed. 1986), has come in some contexts to refer
to any "notably decent, pleasant, generous p€rson," as in
"Isn't he a doll?" That is the way language evolves,
especially in a lively, spontaneous culture such as ours.
Words themselves are metaphors, and it is in their nature
to acquire meanings completely detached from original,
concrete detail, whether or not sex related. Thus the
phrase "BS" clearly relies on no distinction between cows
and bulls.
Here, the phrase "one of :the boys" was used in a sexneutral sense: it was used of a. woman, .and since it
evidently referred to her camaraderie with clerical staff
at Price Waterhous,e, the statistical probability is overwhelmingly that they were predominantly women. The
phrase's connotation of easy familiarity (an "ordinary,
amiable man . . . without side or lofty dignity; = ORDINARY JOE: His Eminence was trying to be one of the
boys," id. at 305) easily escapes its masculine origins.
The phrase does not manifest sexism, notwithstanding
the solemn avowals of the plaintiff, the district court and
the majority.
But this case does necessitate a study of just what
expressions Congress may have wished to wash from the
American tongue. The remark related to another candidate in another year. It plainly was not "direct evidence that [Hopkins's] gender was a significant motivating factor in her failure to make partner." Maj. at
470.
In discussing sex stereotyping, the district court gave
great weight to the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a witness purporting to be an expert in that field. She claimed
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to be able to find forbidden stereotypin g simply by reading partners' comments -without informatio n about the
truth of the matters commented upon. Of course where
the remarks themselves carry such a tint (if, for example, a commenter had said, "She's too masculine "),
anyone could do so. But (apart from the "charm school"
remark) no Hopkins detractor said any such thing. Dr.
Fiske's expertise rose to the occasion. Her arts enabled
her to detect sex stereotypin g based largely on "the
intensity of the negative reaction." Tr. at 559. So if an
observer characteriz ed someone as "overbeari ng and arrogant and abrasive and running over people," an expert
such as Dr. Fiske could discern-a nd would, if the subject were a woman-th at they stemmed from unconscious stereotypes. Dr. Fiske could do this without meeting the subject of the comment or making any inquiry
into a possible factual basis. Id. at 569, 595-97. To an
expert of Dr. Fiske's qualifications, it seems plain that
no woman could be overbearing, arrogant or abrasive:
any observations to that effect would necessarily be discounted as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like
this is to prevail in federal courts, no employer can base
any adverse action as to a woman on such attributes.
2. The evaluation process gave weight to such comments. This generaliza tion suffers precisely the defect
of the first leg of the tripod of liability: it depends
entirely upon comments that could have adversely affected Hopkins. Either they related to other candidacies
in other years, or they represente d her supporters ' views
or intuitions about her adversarie s. All we have that
connects in any potentially adverse way with Hopkins is
the "charm school" remark.4
4 If this leg is in any way based on the firm's procedure of giving substantial weight to- "no" votes, it is inconsistent with the
district court's prior finding that "the firm's practice of giving
'no' votes great weight treated male and female candidates in the
same way." 618 F.Supp. at 1116. See Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759
F.2d 80, 85 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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3. Neglect of duty to address problem of stereotyping.
Key to the district court's finding of liability was Price
Waterhouse's failure to institute special programs for
sensitizing partners to sex stereotyping, or otherwise
to stamp it out of the evaluation process. 618 F.Supp. at
1120. This breaks new ground, blithely free of any effort to link it to any established legal principles. Nor
is the new theory intelligibly defined. What set of facts
triggers the duty? If such an omission is to ground liability, perhaps the plaintiff should bear an initial burden of demonstratin g that gender stereotyping was more
probably than not the cause of the adverse employment
decision. The majority, like the district court, fails to
clarify this important issue, perhaps because it is so
clear that Hopkins failed to make such a showing.

From the facts here, it looks as though the duty to
sensitize has a hair trigger. The implications are serious.
The more delicate the trigger, the more completely this
court has dropped the requirement of intentional discrimination out of the law. As few employers can say
with confidence that those who run its hiring and promotion are one hundred percent free of what may later be
characterized as forbidden stereotyping, the only safe
course will be to institute programs of the sort approved
by the district court. The rule turns Title VII from a
prohibition of discriminato ry conduct into an engine for
rooting out sexist thoughts.
4. Innocent alone, the three factors combined to produce discrimination in the case of this plaintiff. Such
alchemy is mysterious. Having found that specific complaints caused the Policy Board's adverse decision and
that there was ample justification for the complaints,
the district court took up the allegations of stereotyping
floating in the Price Waterhouse ether and the remarkable intuitions of Dr. Fiske. 618 F.Supp. at 1117-20.
The court began on a cautious note-some negative com-
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ments on Hopkins "might be attributed to sex stereotyping." Id. at 1118. It next determined that the commenters "may have been influenced by a sex bias." Id.
It then progressed from "might" to "did," but never
revealed how it reached the final ipse dixit.
The evidence here establishes at most the existence of
sexist attitudes. Thus there can be no doubt that this
court's decision in Toney v. Block controls. The showing
of "generalized discrimination" can at the most establish
a prima facie case, requiring defendant to meet its burden of showing non-pretextual grounds for its action.
The district court properly found those established, restoring the burden to plaintiff.
The majority would eviscerate Toney by a clever name
change: calling the case one of mixed motive, the majority looks to precedents in related areas where a party
acting with one permissible motive and one unlawful one
may prevail only by affirmatively proving that it would
have acted as it did even if the forbidden motive were
absent. I have no quarrel with this principle. See National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2475, 76
L.Ed.2d 667 ( 1983) ; Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct.
568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). But it has no relevance where, as here, discrimination has "not been specifically attributed to the employment decision of which
the plaintiff complains." Toney, 705 F.2d at 1366. Toney
does not permit a plaintiff to invoke the "mixed motive"
concept whenever ( 1) he or she has shown only background evidence of some generalized discrimination and
(2) defendant has proven that a non-pretextual reason
"formed the basis" of the act. If this court is to deepsix Toney, it should do so en bane.
There is not enough evidence of intentional discrimination to support a verdict for Hopkins under any established approach to Title VII liability. The stereotype
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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civ. A. No. 84-3040
ANN

B. HOPKINS,
Plaintiff,

v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE,

Defendant.

Sept. 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM
GESELL, District Judge.
Plaintiff was proposed for partnership in Price Waterhouse, a nationwide professional partnership, but was
held for further consideration at the next annual partnership selection. The following year the partners in the unit
where she worked decided not to propose her a second
time. Plaintiff then resigned and filed this suit alleging
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2. The Court is asked to order that she be made
a partner and to award back pay and other monetary
relief. A bench trial lasting four and one-half days followed extensive discovery. After receiving proposed findings of fact, further briefs, and hearing full argument,
the Court reaches the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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Background
Price Waterhouse is a partnership that specializes in
providing auditing, tax and management consulting services primarily to private corporations and government
agencies. At the time this action was filed, Price Waterhouse had 662 partners operating in 90 offices scattered
across the nation. Its partners are certified public accountants and other specialists.
Despite its size and geographic dispersal, Price Waterhouse has consistently sought to maintain the traditional
characteristics of a professional partnership both in its
management and partnership selection practices. Partners
manage the firm through a Senior Partner and Policy
Board elected by all the partners. New partners are regularly selected from the ranks of the partnership's senior
managers through an elaborate recommendation and review process that culminates in a partnership-wide vote
in which the successful candidates are approved. There is
no limitation on the number of partners who may be
selected in any one year.
The admissions process takes place annually and begins
when the partners of each local office may propose that
one or more senior managers from their office be con"•
sidered as partnership candidates. Partners in the local
offices draft written recommendations based on a detailed
consideration of the candidates' qualifications. These proposals are distributed to all of the firm's 662 partners
and each partner is invited to submit evaluation forms
on any candidate about whom the partner may have
information. Partners who have significant and recent
contact with the candidate submit "long-form" evaluations
and partners who only have a limited basis upon which
to evaluate the candidate submit "short form" evaluations. These forms ask the partners to rank the candidates relative to other recent partnership candidates in
48 different categories ranging from practice development
and technical expertise to interpersonal skills and partici-
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pation in civic activities. The numeri cal rankin gs in this
exhaustive list of relevant, neutra l criteri a is supplemented by asking the partne rs to indicate whethe r they
believe the candid ate should be admitt ed to the partne rship, denied partne rship or held for furthe r consideration and asking them to provide a short comment explaining their assessment.
The Admissions Committee reviews each candid ate's
personnel file and members of the Committee make visits
to some local offices to intervi ew partne rs who have commented in order to determine more precisely the basis for
their views on the candidates. The Admissions Committee then prepar es a summa ry of the evaluations and other
inform ation and makes its recommendations to the Policy
Board. If the recommendation is to "hold" a candid ate
for reconsideration in a later year or a "no" recommendation denying admission, the Committee prepar es a short
written statem ent summa rizing its reasons.
The Policy Board reviews the recommendations of the
Admissions Committee and votes to include a candid ate on
the partne rship ballot, to "hold" the candid ate, or to deny
partne rship. While the Admissions Committee's recommendations focuses primar ily on the qualifications of the
individual candidate, the Policy Board may occasionally
interje ct business considerations and decide to recommend a candid ate because of the firm's need for a particular type of partne r or a particu lar skill. The candidates recommended by the Policy Board are submit ted to
the entire partne rship for election, and candid ates who
are not included on the ballot are informed of the Board' s
reasons for rejecti ng their candidacy. Candid ates who
have been held may be reproposed in later years and the
review process begins again. Price Waterh ouse made
every document genera ted by this admissions process on
candid ates proposed for admission in 1982, 1983 and
1984 available to the plainti ff during the course of
discovery in this case.
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In 1982 the plaintiff was proposed for partnership by
her office, the Office of Government Services ( OGS) , which
specializes in designing and implementing consulting and
management projects for government agencies. Plaintiff
was the only woman among the 88 candidates for partnership that year. All of the partners in OGS at that time
were men. Indeed, as of July, 1984 only seven of the 662
partners at Price Waterhouse were women.
Plaintiff had had a successful career as a senior manager in OGS and had played a significant role in developing business for the firm. She played a key role in Price
Waterhouse's successful effort to win a multi-million dollar contract with the Department of State. Afterwards,
she helped prepare a proposal and manage a project for
a computerized system to handle the State Department's
real property worldwide and successfully managed the
preparation of a competitive proposal for a computer system to track loans of the Farmers' Home Administration.
She had no difficulty dealing with clients and her clients
appear to have been very pleased with her work. None of
the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that
year had a comparable record in terms of successfully
securing major contracts for the partnership. The partners in the OGS office fully endorsed her proposal for
partnership. She was generally viewed as a highly competent project leader who worked long hours, pushed vigorously to meet deadlines and demanded much from the
multidisciplinary staffs with which she worked.
The comments submitted to the Admissions Committee,
however, indicated that plaintiff had problems with her
"interpersonal skills;" specifically, she had trouble in dealing with staff members. Eight of the thirty-two partners
who submitted evaluations recommended that she be denied admission, three favored holding her for reconsideration, and eight indicated that they had insufficient basis
for an opinion. Supporters and opponents of her candidacy indicated that she was sometimes overly aggressive,
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with

44a

1ff.1 She sometimes used profanity and appeared to be
insensitive to others. These negative comments and the
significant number of "no" votes, most of which were by
partners filing short forms because of their limited contact with the plaintiff, were determinativ e in the Admission Committee's decision to recommend "that she
should be HELD at least a year to afford time to demonstrate that she has the personal and leadership qualities
required of a partner." 2 After a full discussion the Policy Board adopted this recommendation.
After learning that her candidacy had been put on hold
plaintiff, at the urging of the Senior Partner, underwent
a Quality Control Review in order to improve her chances
of making partner the next year. Several partners indicated that they planned to give the plaintiff opportunities
to demonstrate her abilities and receive more exposure.
However, these partners never followed through on their
plans and the favorable results of the Quality Control
Review came too late because just four months after the
Policy Board's recommendations the partners in OGS decided not to repropose the plaintiff for partnership. By
that time, two partners in the OGS office strongly opposed her candidacy. Without strong support within that
office, it was felt that her candidacy could not possibly be
successful.
After the decision not to repropose, the plaintiff was
advised that it was very unlikely that she would be admitted to partnership. Rather than waiting to try again
or accepting an offer to remain as a senior manager, she
resigned from Price Waterhouse in January, 1984. After
pursuing the appropriate administrativ e remedies she
brought this action.
Discussion
From the outset Price Waterhouse has conceded that
plaintiff was qualified to be considered for partnership
1

Plf. Ex. 21.

2

Plf. Ex. No. 19; Tr. 267-68.
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and1 probably would have been admitted but for the complaints about her interpers onal skills. Consequently, there
is no dispute that the plaintiff has presented a ]Yf'ima
facie case under Title VII by showing that she was a
qualified partnersh ip candidate, she was rejected, and
Price Waterho use continues to seek partners with her
qualifications. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467
U.S. 867, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2799, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 ( 1984) ;
Texas Departm ent of Commun ity Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 & n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 & n. 6, 67 L.Ed.
2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668
( 1973). The only dispute between the parties is whether
Price Waterho use's concerns about the plaintiff' s interpersonal skills present a legitimate, nondiscr iminator y
reason to deny partners hip or constitut e a pretext to disguise sex discrimination.
Plaintiff advanced three argumen ts for maintain ing
that the decision was discrimin atory: ( 1) the criticisms
of plaintiff' s interpers onal skills were fabricate d; (2)
even if the firm believed her interpers onal skills were
deficient, Price Waterhouse has routinely admitted male
candidat es with interpers onal skills problems if they had
strong qualifications in other areas and would have admitted her if she had not been a woman; (3) the criticisms of the plaintiff' s interpers onal skills for a product
of sexual stereotyp ing by male partners and the firm's
partners hip selection process improper ly gave full weight
to these discrimin atory evaluations. Price Waterhouse
denies these allegations and claims that plaintiff was
properly denied partners hip because the firm, for legitimate business reasons, seeks to avoid having abrasive
partners who might jeopardize morale and be incapable
of successfully supervis ing staff as they move among
different locations in response to work demands. Although plaintiff' s argumen ts are closely interrela ted, it is
necessary to examine them separately.
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1. Fabrication of Complaints About Interpersonal Skills.

The interpersonal skills of prospective partners was
properly an important part of Price Waterhouse's written
partner ship evaluation criteria. Inability to get along
with staff or peers is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to admit a candidate to partnership. Cf.
Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 764 F.2d 175,
37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1862 (3d Cir.1985);
Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 73 (1st
Cir.1984), cert. denied, - - U.S. - - , 105 S.Ct. 433,
83 L.Ed.2d 359 ( 1984) ; Burrus v. United Telephone of
Kansas, 683 F.2d 339, 342-43 (10th Cir.1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 491, 74 L.Ed.2d 633
(1982).

It is clear that the complaints about the plaintiff's interpersonal skills were not fabricated as a pretext for
discrimination. Even the plaintiff admitted that she is a
"hard-driving" manager who pushes her staff and occasionally uses profanity.3 Contemporaneous records of
counseling sessions and evaluations conducted well before
the plaintiff was proposed for partnership indicate that
partners found her too assertive, overly critical of others,
impatient with her staff, and counselled her to soften her
image. 4 At the time, plaintiff indicated that she agreed
with many of these criticisms. Even partners who
strongly supported her partnership candidacy acknowledged these deficiencies, although in more muted tones,
when emphasizing the high quality of her work and her
value to the firm. Staff members who testified on the
plaintiff's behalf indicated that she was an effective manager but her hard-driving style might be regarded as
"controversial" and it required "diplomacy, patience and
guts" to work with her. 5 Plaintiff's conduct provided
3

Tr. 44, 52.

4

Def.Ex. No. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 24, 25.

5

Tr. 423, 434.
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ample justificatio n for the complaints that formed the
basis of the Policy Board's decision.
Plaintiff also alleges that the two OGS partners who
blocked reproposing her after the Policy Board held her
candidacy for reconsideration falsified their reasons to
hide their discrimina tory motives. There is not sufficient
proof to support this allegation. One partner recommended that she be put on hold when she was first proposed and apparently opposed reproposal because he found
her disagreeable to work with and had reservation s about
her technical skills and dedication to the firm. Although
there is some suggestion that this partner may have held
a personal grudge against the plaintiff, there is no proof
that his position was animated by animosity toward her
sex.
The second partner supported the plaintiff when she
was first proposed, but changed his position after receiving additional criticism of her manageme nt style from
staff members, having several conversations with the
plaintiff, and reflecting on his previous experience with
her work. His decision to oppose the plaintiff's candidacy
put him in the uncomfortable position of being in direct
conflict with the head partner in the office, who was one
of the plaintiff's biggest boosters. Although the plaintiff
disputes his version of the events that led him to change
his vote, the Court found him to be a credible witness
and accepts his account of these events. Plaintiff has
failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the explanations given by these two partners were pretextual .
As a result, plaintiff has failed to show that the decision of the OGS partners not to repropose her was discriminator y. While offers from several partners to arrange assignments which might have improved her chances
for partnershi p never materialize d and no one made any
effort to check on the plaintiff's current relationship with
staff members after she was placed on hold, the evidence
before the Court indicates that this was due to the timing
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of the partnership evaluation process rather than any
discriminatory motives. Only a few months separated the
announcement that plaintiff had been placed on hold and
the vote not to repropose her so the firm had little opportunity to change plaintiff's assignment or do a thorough
investigation into her subsequent relationships with staff.
The decision not to repropose was due to the unexpected
position taken by the two partners discussed above and
plaintiff has not proven that their actions were discriminatory.

2. Balancing Interpersonal Skills Against Other
Qualifications.
Plaintiff alleges that even if there were problems with
her interpersonal skills she was so highly qualified in
every other respect that the firm would have made her a
partner if it had not discriminated against her because
of her sex. She claims that the Policy Board invariably
admits men who have interpersonal skills problems and
comparing her "superb" record with that of these men
show that she is a victim of classic disparate treatment.
Price Waterhouse does not concede that interpersonal
skills were the plaintiff's sole deficiency, but it admits
that they were the principle and determinative reason for
the firm's decision. Nonetheless, Price Waterhouse claims
that the male candidates that the plaintiff points to are
not comparable and do not indicate disparate treatment.
,F ortunately the Court does not have to engage in the
difficult task of second-guessing the Policy Board's balancing of professional skills of candidates from different
years in order to resolve this allegation. The contemporaneous records generated by the partnership selection
procedure demonstrate that Price Waterhouse had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguishing between the plaintiff and the male partners with whom she /
compares herself.
From past partnership admissions records the plaintiff
has identified two male candidates who were criticized for
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their int<1rpersonal skills because they were perceived as
being aggressive, overbearing, abrasive or crude, but were
recommended by the Policy Board and elected partner.
Price Waterho use points out that in both cases the Policy
Board expressed substant ial reservati ons about the candidates' interpers onal skills but ultimatel y made a "business decision" to admit the candidat es because they had
skills which the firm had a specific, special need and the
firm feared that their talents might be lost if they were
put on hold. In one case the Policy Board rejected a
"hold" recommendation by the Admissions Committee because of business considerations. In addition, these candidates received fewer evaluations from partners recommending that they be denied partnersh ip and the negative
comments on these candidat es were less intense than
those directed at the plaintiff.~
The significance of "no" votes and negative comments
warrants some further comment. In the course of this
trial, Price Waterho use has been very forthcoming in
providing informat ion on its partnersh ip section process.
The evidence as a whole indicates that over the years the
firm has consistently placed a high premium on candidates' ability to deal with subordin ates and peers on an
interpers onal basis and to promote cordial relations within
a firm which is necessarily dependent on team effort. Not
only are candidat es regularly held because of concerns
about their interpers onal skills-th e Policy Board takes
any evaluations recommending denial of partnersh ip or a
negative reaction on this basis very seriously. Despite
Def.Ex. Nos. 73, 83, 84; Plf.Ex. No. 20. In post-trial briefing,
the plaintiff sought to raise two additional examples. The evidence
before the Court on these candidates is fragmenta ry, at best,
consisting of comments taken out of context, statistical summaries
of their evaluation forms and brief notes. From this limited evidence it appears that these candidates also evoked fewer and less
intense negative comments than the plaintiff. The Court finds that
the plaintiff has not provided sufficient proof to demonstra te disparate treatment based on these candidates .
6
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the fact that the negative comments of short form evaluations are often in sharp contrast to the glowing reports
of partners who have had extensive contact with the
candidate , such comments are treated as serious reservations and given great weight. "No" votes, even from
short form commentors who may only have had very
limited contact with the candidate, often result in a "no"
or "hold" decision.
Thus, while plaintiff argues that her accomplishments
in generatin g business, managem ent and client satisfaction were so far above average that she would have been
admitted despite any interpers onal skills problems if Price
Waterho use had honestly balanced all her qualifications,
Price Waterho use responds by pointing out that she received very few "yes" votes and more "no" votes than all
but two of the 88 candidat es that year. These no votes
and negative comments, largely from partners outside
OGS, effectively placed the plaintiff toward the bottom
of the candidat e pool. Regardless of its wisdom, the
firm's practice of giving "no" votes great weight treated
male and female candidat es in the same way. "The
issue in a case of alleged failure to hire or promote is
not the objective superior ity or inferiori ty of the plaintiff's qualifications, but rather whether the defendan t's
selection criteria -be they wise or foolish- are nondiscriminatory." Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 85 n. 3
(D.C.Cir. 1985). The Court finds that the firm's emphasis on negative comments did not, by itself, result in
any discrimin atory disparate treatmen t.
Plaintiff tried to reinforce her claim of disparate treatment with a number of statistics that proved wholly inconclusive. Plaintiff attempte d to show that the small
number of women partners at Price Waterho use indicates
discrimin ation but her proof lacked sufficient data on the
number of qualified women available for partners hip and
failed to take into account that the present pool of
partners have been selected over a long span of years
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durmg which the pool of available qualified women has
changed. Women have only recently entered the accounting and related fields in large numbers and there is evidence that many potential women partners were hired
away from Price Waterhouse by clients and rival accounting firms.
Although women partnership candidates have been
elected to partnership at a slightly lower rate than men
(60% versus 68%), the difference is not statistically
significant. The other statistical studies presented by
plaintiff only bear an indirect relationship to Price Waterhouse's practice in partnership selection, and when corrected to examine the appropriate comparisons, lack statistical significance. No conclusion can be drawn from this
fragile data.
3. Stereotyping and the Partnership Selection Process.

Plaintiff's final argument begins with the allegation
that the male partners who criticized her interpersonal
skills applied a double standard. She claims that she was
not evaluated as a manager, but as a woman manager,
based on a sexual stereotype that prompts males to regard
assertive behavior in women as being more offensive and
intolerable than comparable behavior in men because some
men do not regard it as appropriate "feminine" behavior.
Plaintiff claims that this type of sexual stereotyping is
reflected in comments about her aggressiveness and profanity that indicate she was being evaluated as a woman
and not simply as a partnership candidate. One commentator said "she may have overcompensated for being
a woman." Another suggested that she needed to take a
"course at charm school." Supporters indicated that her
critics judged her harshly due to her sex. One acknowledged "Ann has a clearly different personality," but
"[m] any male partners are worse than Ann (language
and tough personality), " and people were only focusing on
her profanity "because its a lady using foul language."
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Another conceded that she initially came across as
"macho" but said, "if you get around the personal ity
thing she's at the top of the list or way above average. "
Another defended her by saying, "she had matured from
a tough-talking, somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to
an authorita tive, formidable, but much more appealin g
lady partner candidat e." '7 When plaintiff consulted with
the head partner at OGS, who was her stronges t supporter and responsible for telling her what problems the
Policy Board had identified with her candidacy, she was
advised to walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.8
.Some comments on other women partners hip candidat es
in prior years support the inference that the partners hip
evaluation process at Price Waterhouse was affected by
sexual stereotyping. Candidates were viewed favorably if
partners believed they maintain ed their f emini ty while
becoming effective professional managers. To be identified
as a "women's liber" was regarded as negative comment.
Nothing was done to discourage sexually biased evaluations. One partner repeatedly commented that he could
not consider any woman seriously as a partners hip candidate and believed that women were not even capable of
functioning as senior manage rs-yet the firm took no
action to discourage his comments and recorded his vote
in the overall summary of the evaluations. Besides the
plaintiff, the Admissions Committee rejected at least two
other women candidat es because partners believed that
they were curt, brusque and abrasive, acted like "Ma
Barker" or tried to be "'one of the boys'." Comments
suggesting that sex stereotypes may have influenced the
partners ' evaluations of interpers onal skills were not
7

Plf.Ex. No. 21; Def.Ex. No. 30, 31; Tr. 321.

8

Tr. 102, 316.
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frequent, but they appear as part of the regular fodder
of the partnershi p evaluations.I'
Plaintiff presented a well qualified expert, Dr. Susan
Fiske, who has done extensive research and study in the
field of stereotyping. Dr. Fiske examined the partners
comments about the plaintiff and other partnershi p candidates and gave opinions as to the possible presence of
sex stereotyping. Dr. Fiske did not purport to be able
to determine whether or not any particular reaction was
determined by the operation of sex stereotypes. However,
she did identify comments that she believed were influenced by sex stereotypes. Dr. Fiske stated that in her
opinion unfavorable comments by male partners, slanted
in a negative direction by operation of male stereotyping,
were a major factor in the firm's evaluation of the plaintiff. But she could not pinpoint the degree to which stereotyping had influenced the selection process.
That deep within males and females there exist sexually based reactions to the personal characteri stics of
one of the opposite sex surely comes as no surprise. It is
well documented that men evaluating women in managerial occupations sometimes apply stereotypes which
discriminate against women.110 Indeed, the subtle and unconscious discrimination created by sex stereotyping appears to be a major impediment to Title VII's goal of
9

10 See, e.g., Ruble•, Cohen and Ruble, Sex Stereotypes: Occupational Barriers for Women, 27 Amer.Behav.Sc. 339 (1984) (surveying literature,) ; R.M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORAT ION 206-42 (1977) (reporting results of study) ;
Rosen and Jerdee·, Perceived Sex Differences in Managerial Relevant Characteristics, 4 Sex Roles 837 (1978) (same); Rosen and
Jerdee, Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions,
59 J.Appl.Psych . 9 (1974) (same); Schein, The Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management Characteristics, 57 J.App.Psych . 95 (1973) (same).

!
I

,. .

Def.Ex. No. 63.

-
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ensuring equal employment opportunities.11 Dr. Fiske
testified that situations, like that at Price Waterhouse, in
which men evaluate women based on limited contact with
the individual in a traditionally male profession and a
male working environment foster stereotyping. One common form of stereotyping is that women engaged in assertive behavior are judged more critically because aggressive conduct is viewed as a masuculine characteristic.:12
Establishing a claim of disparate treatment based on
subjective evaluations requires pr of of discriminatory
motive or purpose. International Brothe';-hood of Team~
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 835 n. 15, 97 S.Ct.
1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 ( 1977). The Court finds
that while stereotyping played an undefined rote in blocking plaintiff's admission to the partnership in this instance, it was unconscious on the part of the partners who
submitted comments. The comments of the •individual
partners and the expert evidence of Dr. Fiske do not
prove an intentional discriminatory mot,ive or purpose.
A far more subtle process is involved when one who is
in a distinct minority may be viewed differently by the
majority because the individual deviates from an artificial.
standardized profile. Even in examining the comments
months later at trial, it is impossible to label any particular negative reaction as being motivated by intentional sex stereotyping. Business women who earn a place
at the highest ranks of their profession by combining
ability with a strong persistent effort to ·succeed fre ..i
quently sense antagonism from some male colleagµ,es

•

See Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per
Se As A Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L.Rev. 345,
11

•

•

349-61 (1980).

See, e.g., Wiley and Eskilson, Coping in the Corporation, Se~ •
Role Constraints, 12 J.App.Soc.Psych. 1, 8 (1982); Prather: W~
Can't Women Be More Like Men: A Summary of the Sociopsychological Factors Hindering Women's Advancement in the Professions, 15 Am.Beh.Sc. 172 (1971).
12

.•
•

•
~

•
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•

•

whose contact with the working female as an equal has
been limited. However, considering the infinite variety of
work conditions; differences in experience, education and
perceptions among individuals in working encounters; as
well as the fact that the interactions of personalities of
either sex are as complex and inscrutable and as infinite
as combinations of genes will produce, it is impossible
to accept the view that Congress intended to have courts
police every instance where subjective judgment may be
tainted by unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related
to sex.
But plaintiff takes her argument one step further and
stresses that the Price Waterhouse partnership evaluation
system permitted negative comments tainted by stereotyping to defeat her candidacy, despite clear indications
that the evaluations were tainted by discriminatory stereotyping. All the evaluators were men. The Policy Board
gave great weight to the negative views of individuals
who had very little contact with the plaintiff. Several of
the negative comments allude to the plaintiff's sex and
many might be attributed to sex stereotyping. Despite
the fact that the comments on women candidates often
suggested that the male evaluators may have been influenced by a sex bias, the Policy Board never addressed
the problem. The firm never took any steps in its partnership policy statement or in the evaluation forms submitted to partners to articulate a policy against discrimination or to discourage sexual bias?3 The Admissions
Committee never attempted to investigate whether any of
Price Waterhouse, submitted evidence to show it had promulgated a general policy of equal employment opportunities in employment for all minorities . Def.Ex. Nos. 88, 89. However, the exhibits before the Court only reflect a policy statement issued sometime in 1983. More importantly, the statement is directed generally a.t staff employment. It is not clear whether it applies to the
partnership selection process at all and it does not address any
special concerns with discrimination against women in an overwhelmingly male partnership.
13
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the negative comments concerning the plaintiff were based
14
on a discrim inatory doubt standar d.
Whenever a promotion system relies on highly subjective evaluations of candidates by individuals or panels
dominated ·by members of a different sex, there is ground
for concern rthat such "high level subjectivity subject s the
ultimat e promotion decision to the intolerable occurrence
of conscious or unconscious prejudice." Robinson v. Union
Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir.1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 65, 54 L.Ed.2d 78 (1977).
Such procedures "must be closely scrutinized because of
their capacity for masking unlawful bias." Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 965 (D.C.Cir.1979). This scrutiny
comprehends examination of evaluation procedures that
permit or give effect ito sexual stereotyping. Differential
treatme nt on account of sex, even if it is not obviously
based on a charact eristic of sex, violates Title VII. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C.Cir.1985).
An employer who treats a woman with an assertiv e personality in a different manner than if she had been a man
is guilty of sex discrimination. See Craik v. Minnesota
State University Board, 731 F.2d 465, 481-84 (8th Cir.
1984) ; Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F.Supp. 1231, 1235
(D.D.C.1976) . A female cannot be excluded from a partnership dominated by males if a sexual bias plays a part
in the decision and the employer is aware that such bias
played a part in the exclusion decision.
Although the stereotyping by individual partner s may
have been unconscious on their part, the maintenance of
a system that gav,e weight ito such biased criticisms, was
a conscious act of the partner ship as a whole. There is
no direct evidence of any determined purpose to maliciously discriminate against women but plaintiff appears
to have been a victim of "omissive and subtle" discrimination created by a system thait made evaluations based
14

Def.Ex. No. 23; Tr. 280-81; Connor Dep. at 103.

•
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on "outmoded attiitudes" determinative. Marimont v.
Califano, 464 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 & n. 15 (D.D.C. 1979).
As noted above, the firm accorded substantial weight to
negative comments and ,recommendations, even if · they
came from partners who had limited ,contact with a candidate. The evidence indicates ,t hat Price Waterhouse
should have been aware that women being evaluated by
male partners might well be victims of discriminatory
stereot1,pes. Yet the firm made no efforts to maJ.rn part- ·
ners sensitive to the dangers, .to discourage comments
tainted by sexism, or to investigate comments to determine whether they were influenced by ste,reotypes. ..

-

•

The Court is aware that this case involves applying•
Title VII to a professional partnership. Partnership con•
sideration was clearly a privilege of plaintiff's employ•
ment covered by Tltle VII. Hishon v. King and Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69,. 104 S.Ot. -2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).
Title VII does not bar a partnership from considering
subjective evaluations of interpersonal skills as significant
criteria in the partnership selection process. Subjective
evaluations in high-level, pr,ofessioilal jobs have received
•
particular deference in Title VII cases. See Zahorik v.
Cornell University, 729 F.3tl 85, 93 (2d Cir.1984); Harris v. Group Health Insurance, 662 F.2d 869, 873 (D.C. •
Cir.1981); Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in
High Places, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 945, 973-78 (1982); Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment OppcfiJtunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 Wm.
•
& Mary L.Rev. 45, 48-62 ( 1979). However, while pa-rtnerships must be given freedom to evaluate the qualificatiens
of employees who seek .to.,..b~ome partners-, they are not ,.
free to injeot stereotyped assumptions about women into
the selection process. Neither a partnership nor any,..other
employer can remain indifferent to indications that its
~valuation system is subjl ct to sex bias, as Price Waterhouse did in plaintiff's case. Price Waterhouse's failure
to take the steps necessary to alert. partners to ,t hr pos,,

•
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sibiHty that their judgments may be biased, to diS<!ourage
stereotyping, and to investigate and discard, where appropriate, comments that suggest a double standard constitutes a violation of Title VII in ithis instance.15
Price Waterhouse had every reason and legal right to
come down hard on abrasive conduct in men or women
seeking partnership. But " '[i] n forbidding employers to
diS<!riminate ,a gainst individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.' " County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 180, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 2253, 68 L.Ed.2d 751
(1981), quoting Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1370,
1375 n. 13, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). This is not a case
where "standards were shaped only by neutral profes..
sional and technical considerations and not by any stereotypical notions of female roles and images." Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 38fair Empl.Prac.Cas.
(BNA) 404, 412 (8th Cir.1985). Discriminatory stereotyping of females was permitted to play a part. Comments
influenced by sex stereotypes were made by partners; the
firm's evaluation process gave substantial weight to these
comments.; and the partnership failed to address the conspicuous problem of stereotyping in partnership evaluations. While these three factors might have been innocent
alone, they combined to produce discrimination in the case
of this plaintiff. The Court .finds that the Policy Board's
decision not rto admit the plaintiff rto partnership was
tainted by discriminatory evaluations that were the direct
15 Common sense is confirmed by the literature, on the problem
of sex stereotyping which suggests that making evaluators aware
of the risk of biased evaluations and inquiring as to whether generalizations are supported by concrete incidents can be effective
in eliminating or minimizing stereotyping. See Taub, supra note
7, at 3600, 395-97; Wiley and Eskilson, supra note 8, at 9.
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result of its failure to address the evident problem of
sexual stereotyping in partners' evaluations.16
Remedy
Because plaintiff had considerable problems dealing with
staff and peers, the Court cannot say that she would have
been elected to partnership if the Policy Board's decision
had not been tainted by sexually biased evaluations. Even
supporters of the plaintiff viewed her style as somewhat
offensive and detrimental to her effectiveness as a manager. However, once a plaintiff proves •t hat sex discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the plaintiff is entitled to relief unless the employer has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the decision
would have been the same absent discrimination. Williams
v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C.Cir.1980); Day v.
Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (D.C.Cir.1976). Price
Waterhouse has not done so. Where sex discrimination
is present, even if a promotion decision is a mixture of
legitimate and discriminatory considerations, uncertainties must be resolved against the employer so that the
16 There is currently a split among the circuits as to• whether a
subjective evaluation process may be challenged based on disparate
impact and disparate treatment theories or may only be, challenged
on disparate treatment theory. Compare Pouncy v. Prudential
Insurance Company of America, 668 F.2d 795, 799-801 (5th Cir.
1982) (discriminatory impact model inappropriate• for challenging
subjective evaluation procedures) with Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d
1516, 1522-25 (11th Cir. 1985) (both models may be used to challenge subjective evaluations) ; Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1288
n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disparate impact applied to, evaluation
process with some subjective elements). We need not become involved in this dispute. Plaintiff cannot show the substantial
statistical disparity ordinarily required to show that a subjective
evaluation process produces a discriminatory disparate· impact.
See Yartzoff v. State of Oregon, 745 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1984). This
decision is based on disparate treatment where, the employer maintained a subjective evaluation process which, based on the proof
presented in the comments on the plaintiff, resulted in plaintiff's
evaluation being tainted by a discriminatory bias.

60a
remedial purposes of Title VII will not be thwarted by
saddling an individual •subject to discrimination with an
impossible burden of proof.
However, plaintiff must carry the burden of proof on
another issue. She has the burden of proving that she
was constructively discharged. If the plaintiff resigned
voluntarily, and not because Price Waterhouse made
working conditions intolerable and drove her to quit, she
is not entitled to an order that she made a partner. Clark
v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (D.C.Cir.1981). The
fact that discrimination has occurred does not, by itself,
provide the "aggravating factors" required to prove a
constructive discharge. Id. at 173-74. Plaintiff has not
shown any history of discrimination, humiliation or other
aggravating factors that would have compelled her to
resign. She dropped her allegations of harassment and
retaliation before .t rial. Aside from Price Waterhouse's.
denial of partnership, plaintiff's experience at -the firm
appears to have been quite normal and amicable. The one
incident in which a project managed by rthe plaintiff was
unfavorably evaluated appears to have involved a disagreement over the appropriate technical standards rather
than an improper effort to pressure plaintiff to -resign.
Price Waterhouse offered to retain her as an employee
and some partners even encouraged her to itake this option
rather than resign when it appeared unlikely that she
would become a partner. 17 Being denied partnership was
undoubtedly a professional disappointment and it may
have been professionally advantageous for plaintiff to
leave the firm when it was unlikely she would not obtain her ultimate goal. Disappointments do not constitute
a constructive discharge, however. See Bourque v. Powell
Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th
Cir.1980); Sparrow v. Piedmont Health Systems Agency,
Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1107, 1117-18 (M.D.N.C.1984). Recognizing that in partnerships, as in other employment contexts, "society and the policies underlying Title VII will
1

11

Tr.112.
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be best served if, wherever possible, unlawful discrimination is attacked within the context of exiting employment
relationships." 617 F.2d at 66, plaintiff's failure to show
a constructive discharge requires the Court to deny plaintiff's request for an order directing Price Waterhouse to
make her a partner.

I
I
'

Because plaintiff has failed to prove a constructive
discharge, she is not entitled to any monetary relief for
the period subsequent rto her resignation. Clarlo. v. Marsh,
665 F.2d a;t 1172. Nevertheless, plaintiff has sartisfied
her burden of proving discrimination under Title VII and
established the predicate for an award of backpay from
the date she would have been elected partner, July 1,
1983, until her voluntary resignation on January 17,
1984. Backpay for these few months, limited to the difference between plaintiff's compensation as a senior manager during that period and what her compensation would
have been if elected ,to partnership, might have been appropriate if proof had been presented. However, no evidence has been presented on what compensation plaintiff
would have received if she had been elected partner. The
parties have represented that, without the knowledge or
consent of the Court, they agreed to defer resolving the
amount of backpay until the issue of liability was resolved. But the parties do not have the authority to structure a trial for their own convenience. Issues can only
be separated for a separate trial by order of the Court.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42 (b). No such order was ever requested or
granted in this case. A party who makes an "unauthorized determination not to go forward on issues that were
properly in the case does ,so at his own peril." U.S.
Industries Inc. v. Blake Construction Co., Inc., 765 F.2d
195, 209-10 (D.C.Cir.1985). Under the circumstances
the Court can do no more than recognize plaintiff as the
prevailing party on the issue of liability, grant judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, and award attorneys fees.. No
other equitable relief is appropriate on this record.
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An appropriaite order is entered contemporaneous with
the filing of this memorandum.
ORDER

It appearing for ,reasons set forth in a memorandum
filed this day that plainrtiff has prevailed on the merits of
her claim that denial of partnershi p in her specific situation was caused, in pa.l'lt, by defendant 's failure to protecrt
against the presence of sex discrimination in evaluations
of her qualifications for partnershi p, but that plaintiff
has failed to establish any basis for granting equitable
relief in the form of hackpay or orther relief, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the complaint shall be and hereby is
dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiff ,shall be and hereby is
awarded her reasonable attorneys fees plus costs to be
set by the clerk; and it is fui:,ther
ORDERED, that the parties shall attempt to agree on
an amount to compensate for such reasonable attorney
fees and advise the Court in wrirting on or before September 30, 1985, whether further proceedings to establish the fee award will be necessary.
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 85-6052
ANN B. HOPKINS,

v.

Appellant

PRICE WATERHOUSE

No. 85-6097
ANN B. HOPKINS

v.
·PRICE WATERHOUSE,
Appellant

[Filed Aug. 4, 1987]

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

Before: EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
JOYCE HENS GREEN,* District Judge.

* Of the United States District Court for the, District of Columbia, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (a).
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JUDGM ENT
These causes came on to be heard on the records on
appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, and were argued by counsel. On
conside ration thereof, it is
ORDER ED and ADJUD GED, by this Court, that the
judgme nt of the District Court appeale d from in these
causes is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part,
and these cases are remand ed, in accorda nce with the
Opinion for the Court filed herein this date.

Per Curiam
For The Court
/s/ George A. Fisher
GEORGE A. FISHER
Clerk
Date: August 4, 1987
Opinion for the Court filed by District Judge Green.
Dissent ing opinion filed by Circuit Judge William s.
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APPENDIXD

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 85-6052
ANN B. HOPKINS

v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE
[,F iled Sept. 30, 1987]
Before: EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges;
JOYCE H. GREEN,* District Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
ORDER
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing of
appellee/ cross-appella nt, it is
ORDERED, by the Court, that the petition is denied.

Per Curia.m
FOR THE COURT:
GEORGE A. FISHER
Clerk
By: / s/ Robert A. Bonner
ROBERT A. BONNER
Deputy Clerk
Circuit Judge Williams would grant the petition for rehearing.

* Sitting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 292 (a).
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APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 85-6052
ANN B. HOPKINS

v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE
[Filed Sept. 30, 1987)
Before: WALD, Chief Judge; ROBINSON, MIKVA, EDWARDS, RUTH B. GINSBURG, BORK, STARR,
SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS and D. H.
GINSBURG, Circuit Judges
ORDER
The suggestion for rehearing en bane of appellee/
cross-appellant has been circulated to the full Court. The
taking of a vote thereon was requested. Thereafter, a
majority of the judges of the Court in regular active
service did not vote in favor of the suggestion. Upon
consideration of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED, by the Court en bane, that the suggestion
is denied.

Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
GEORGE A. FISHER
Clerk
By: /s/ Robert A. Bonner
ROBERT A. BONNER
Deputy Clerk
Chief Judge Wald and Circuit Judges Starr and D. H.
Ginsburg did not participate in this order.

